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THE DEATH OF RULES AND STANDARDS 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars have examined the lawmakers’ choice between rules and 
standards for decades. This paper, however, explores the possibility of 
a new form of law that renders that choice unnecessary. Advances in 
technology (such as big data and artificial intelligence) will give rise to 
this new form – the micro-directive – which will provide the benefits of 
both rules and standards without the costs of either.  
Lawmakers will be able to use predictive and communication 
technologies to enact complex legislative goals that are translated by 
machines into a vast catalog of simple commands for all possible 
scenarios. When an individual citizen faces a legal choice, the machine 
will select from the catalog and communicate to that individual the 
precise context-specific command (the micro-directive) necessary for 
compliance. In this way, law will be able to adapt to a wide array of 
situations and direct precise citizen behavior without further 
legislative or judicial action. A micro-directive, like a rule, provides a 
clear instruction to a citizen on how to comply with the law. But, like a 
standard, a micro-directive is tailored to and adapts to each and every 
context.  
While predictive technologies such as big data have already 
introduced a trend toward personalized default rules, in this paper we 
suggest that this is only a small part of a larger trend toward context-
specific laws that can adapt to any situation. As that trend continues, 
the fundamental cost trade-off between rules and standards will 
disappear, changing the way society structures and thinks about law.  	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THE DEATH OF RULES AND STANDARDS 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of precisely 
tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every 
situation. The lawmakers have enough information to anticipate 
virtually all contingencies, such that laws are perfectly calibrated to 
their purpose – they are neither over- nor under-inclusive. Now 
imagine that when a citizen in this world faces a legal decision, she is 
clearly informed of exactly how to comply with every relevant law 
before she acts. This citizen does not have to weigh the reasonableness 
of her actions; nor, does she have to search for the content of a law. She 
just obeys a simple directive. The laws at work in this world are not 
traditional rules and standards. Instead, they take a new form that 
captures the benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the 
costs. This new form – we call it the micro-directive – is the future of 
law. 
When lawmakers enact laws today, they must choose between 
using rules and using standards to achieve a desired goal.1 This choice 
requires a trade-off between certainty and calibration. Rules provide 
certainty through clear ex ante statements of the content of the law.2 
But rules are costly to design because lawmakers must, at the outset, 
identify and analyze all the various scenarios to which rules might 
apply. Rules can also be imprecise and error prone. Because they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The trade-off occurs on a particular level. Any given law may use rules for some 
components and standards for others. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561 (1992); John O. McGinnis & Steven 
Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 Fl. L. Rev. 991, 1027 (2014) (“[I]n the real world, rules 
and standards rarely exist in Platonic forms.”). For demonstrative purposes, we 
follow convention in discussing the rules-standards decision as a binary choice.  
2  The literature on this distinction is vast. See generally id. at 559-560 
(explaining the distinction and collecting sources); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny 
of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803 n. 
1 (2005) (same); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 
961-962 (1995); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING 
ABOUT THE LAW 163-71 (2007); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1990); 
see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term – 
Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
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defined ahead of time, they can be poorly calibrated3 to the events as 
they actually occur.4 
Standards, on the other hand, are adjudicated after the fact. As a 
result, lawmakers avoid high up-front design costs. Moreover, when 
applied after the fact, standards can be precisely tailored or calibrated 
to a specific context as it actually arose.5 But they also generate ex 
ante uncertainty because regulated actors do not know up front 
whether their behavior will be deemed by the adjudicator to comply 
with the standard.6 
We suggest that technological advances in predictive and 
communication technologies will render this trade-off between rules 
and standards unnecessary. A new form of law, the micro-directive, 
will emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and standards 
without the costs of either. These micro-directives will provide ex ante 
behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario.  
The first technology to consider is predictive technology. 
Innovations in big data and artificial intelligence will make it 
increasingly easy to predict the outcomes that certain behavior will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 We use the term calibration to denote the fit of a law to its legislative purpose. 
For example, a 55-mile per hour speed limit may be poorly calibrated because it is too 
low when the weather is perfect and the roads are clear and too high when the 
weather is bad and the roads are crowded. Another term could be “inclusiveness.” 
The 55-mile per hour speed limit is both under- and over-inclusive because it 
prohibits some desirable behavior (driving 60 on a sunny day) and allows some 
undesirable behavior (driving 50 on a rainy day). See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 562; 
McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 1030-31; Schauer, supra note 2, at 803-04; 
Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 NEW ZEALAND L. 
REV. 303, 305-309 (2003); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 992; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal 
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65, 67, 73-74 (1983) (exploring the 
costs of rulemaking and defining under- and over-inclusiveness). What we call 
calibration is similar to what Diver calls congruence. Id. at 67. 
4 More formally, in law-and-economics terms, a rule introduces high ex ante 
decision and error costs because it is costly to predict and set rules for every possible 
scenario. See infra Part I.A. 
5 This precision is less costly for standards because the adjudicator only has to 
figure out the context-specific applications for cases that actually arise, whereas an 
ex ante rule has to address all possible applications. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 
562-63; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1003-1004; McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 
1031.  
6 Kaplow, supra note 1, at 569, 575-576 n. 42, 587-588; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 
974-977; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence 
and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986) (modeling the costs 
of uncertain standards). Our comparisons here assume unbiased lawmakers and 
judges. We discuss bias infra Part II. 
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produce. Lawmakers will ultimately have the ability to cheaply gather 
information and use predictive algorithms and big data to update the 
law instantly based on all relevant factors.7 In effect, this lowers the 
cost of designing precise finely calibrated laws.  
The second technology to consider is communication technology. 
Ubiquitous and instantaneous communication capabilities will reduce 
the uncertainty of law. From the vast catalog of rules generated by 
predictive technology, communication technology will be able to 
identify the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform the 
regulated actor exactly how to comply with the law.8 It will be able to 
translate all the information into a single behavioral directive that 
individuals can easily follow.  
To see how the mechanism might work, consider the regulation of 
traffic speed. In a world of rules and standards, a legislature hoping to 
optimize safety and travel time could enact a rule (a 60 miles-per-hour 
speed limit) or a standard (“drive reasonably”). With micro-directives, 
however, the law looks quite different. The legislature merely states its 
goal. Machines then design the law as a vast catalog of context-specific 
rules to optimize that goal. From this catalog, a specific micro-directive 
is selected and communicated to a particular driver (perhaps on a 
dashboard display) as a precise speed for the specific conditions she 
faces. For example, a micro-directive might provide a speed limit of 
51.2 miles per hour for a particular driver with twelve years of 
experience on a rainy Tuesday at 3:27 pm. The legislation remains 
constant; but the micro-directive updates as quickly as conditions 
change.  
In this article, we explore whether this example could become the 
model for law more broadly. Our long-run prediction is that micro-
directives will become the dominant form of law, culminating in the 
death of rules and standards. But even if that full evolution does not 
happen, micro-directives are certain to become a viable alternative for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The optimal rate of change in law (from the perspective of social welfare or some 
other legislative goal) may be slower. But that optimal rate could be factored in by 
the technology. See infra Part III.B. Courts currently update standards over the span 
of many years. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 
457 (1897). 
8 We define communication function to include two steps. First, there is the 
communication of the context of an actual scenario to the machine. Second there is 
the communication of the legal directive from the machine to the individual. See infra 
Part I.B.. The first step might alternatively be called fact gathering. We lump them 
together because, in practice, the technology facilitating the information flow in each 
direction is likely to be the same or closely related. 
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many laws. This short-run phenomenon is of great importance, as even 
a limited spread of micro-directives has the potential to change the 
way laws are structured and thought about generally. 
This advent of micro-directives may take various paths. In the 
simplest story, the legislature uses the new technology and 
communicates the command to the citizen. We use this example to 
illustrate the concept. More realistically, however, the technology will 
often be implemented at the administrative level by regulators and 
enforcement agencies. Lawmakers may still enact standards, but 
administrative agents will convert them to micro-directives. A third 
possibility is that private citizens will generate the micro-directives. 
Citizens using private predictive technology may inform themselves of 
the most reasonable action in any particular situation. As that private 
technology gets better, two things will happen. First, failure to use the 
technology will become a per se violation of a legal standard. And, 
second, the technology will be able to predict judicial outcomes. Both 
effects will result in citizens using private technology to derive a 
simple micro-directive for how to comply with the law.  
For all of these paths, the result is that laws that look like 
standards to the legislatures will appear as simple and easy-to-follow 
directives to the regulated individual. This form of law is neither a 
standard nor a rule. It provides the certainty of a rule and the 
calibration of a standard, with none of the decision costs associated 
with either. Moreover, the law, in application, morphs from a standard 
(for the legislature) to a set of complex rules (within the machine 
process) to a simple command (for the citizen).  
We describe the rise of micro-directives as the death of rules and 
standards. One might alternatively frame the coming change simply as 
the death of standards. After all, micro-directives are ex ante rules 
that govern behavior. The driver in our example is told exactly how to 
behave ex ante. In that framing, technology has reduced the cost of 
precise ex ante rule making. Rules will no longer be over and under 
inclusive. As a result, the rationale for using standards goes away. 
That is consistent with the conventional law-and-economics definition 
of a rule as having ex ante content (relative to the regulated actor). But 
the lawmakers are not enacting rules. The lawmakers need not spend 
the time to prescribe precise rules. They can enact broad standards 
and let the machines do the rest. Indeed, from the perspective of the 
lawmakers, it is the death of rules. The framing is less important than 
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the recognition that micro-directives will change the foundational 
nature of law.9  
Our analysis is positive rather than a normative. One might think 
of perfect calibration of laws to legislative goals as problematic in a 
system with multiple branches and checks and balances. Indeed, our 
analysis implies a reduced role for judges and perhaps the need for 
institutional reforms to preserve important aspects of our current 
system. Others may view micro-directives as a threat to privacy and 
autonomy. The easier it is for the government to learn information 
about the behavior of an individual and use technology to predict 
outcomes, the more the government can micromanage to achieve 
desired social results. Finally, some may have concerns about ethics 
and moral health in a world where many important decisions are 
automated.10 We do not take a side on these normative questions. We 
do, however, try to flag the areas where the thorniest normative 
questions will arise. 
The primary contribution of this article is to explore the most far-
reaching effects of technology on the general structure of law. This 
contribution builds on and connects with two strands in the law-and-
technology literature. The first strand looks at the effects that 
predictive technology has on the legal services industry.11 The second 
strand looks at the nature of personalized default rules.12  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This question of framing suggests an interesting semantic deficit in the way 
legal academics talk about rules and standards. Readers of our earlier drafts have 
been equally split on what it means to call something a rule. Some infer that the 
label “rule” denotes an ex ante statement of content from the lawmaker. Others infer 
that it denotes an ex ante instruction for the regulated individual. That disconnect 
does not matter much with traditional lawmaking. But as micro-directives 
proliferate, the tension will come to forefront. As a result, not only do actual rules 
and standards die, but so too does the meaningful use of those words to label the laws 
that exist. 
10  See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the 
Occasional Virtues of Fog¸ 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222, 1244 (2009) (standards 
provide for ethical decision making important to moral health). 
11  RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AND INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE (2013) (predicting effects of technology on legal services); RICHARD SUSSKIND, 
THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010) (same); 
Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 914-915 (2013) (same); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1169 (2011) (same); William 
Henderson, A Blueprint for Change 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013) (exploring trends in 
legal markets and how law schools should respond to them); see also Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749 (2010) (predicting the demise 
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We suggest, however, that these strands understate the momentous 
effect that the coming technological revolution will have on law.13 By 
connecting the growing literature on technology and the law to the 
literature on rules and standards, we show that the same technology 
that will bring us automated compliance lawyers and personalized 
default rules will also bring us the micro-directive.14 And that change 
in the form of law will have broader consequences than retail 
personalization of law. Indeed, micro-directives have the potential to 
bring wholesale institutional changes to our entire system of laws and 
the way we choose to regulate behavior. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I sets out our general theory of 
micro-directives and provides demonstrative examples. Part II explores 
the feasibility of the technologies behind micro-directives. Part III 
discusses implications and broader consequences of the rise of micro-
directives and the death of rules and standards. A final section 
concludes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of big law firms); William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38S INT’L REV. 
L. & AND ECON. 5 (2013) (exploring the changing trends in markets for legal services); 
Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of legal 
Services, __ MICH. ST. L. REV. __ (forthcoming).  
12 See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and 
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2013). Porat & Strahilevitz 
provide a theory of personalized default rules in a world of big data. We jump off from 
that point to explore the wholesale effects of technological advances on law more 
generally. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 
working paper (2015) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2654458; Cass Sunstein, 
Deciding By Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013); George S. Geis, Experiment in the 
Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109 (2005). 
13  The closest work to ours is that of John McGinnis and Steven Wasick. 
McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1. Though they reach strikingly different 
conclusions, McGinnis and Wasick begin in the same place as we do, asking how 
technological advances that reduce information costs will affect the balance of rules 
and standards. Focusing primarily on legal search technology and the ability to 
predict judicial outcomes, they predict a world where standards and dynamic rules 
are favored over simple rules. Id. Building on this analysis, we add in the effects of 
communication technology and machine learning to show that standards and rules 
(simple and dynamic) will no longer be viable forms of law. 
14 Porat & Strahilevitz note that the dichotomy of personal and impersonal rules 
is not the same as the dichotomy of rules and standards. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra 
note 12, at 1457-58. Personalized defaults can be rules or standards. And impersonal 
defaults also come in both forms. Id. Beyond that observation, Porat and Strahilevitz 
focus their attention on the personal-impersonal dichotomy. Our analysis suggests, 
however, that all laws – both personal and impersonal – will ultimately gravitate 
toward micro-directives that transcend the distinction between rules and standards.  
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF MICRO-DIRECTIVES AND THE DECLINE OF RULES 
AND STANDARDS  
In this Part we spell out how technology will affect the 
administration of law and the structure of legal content. We outline 
two types of technology that will lead to a dramatic reduction in the 
cost of calibrating and communicating ex ante legal directives, thereby 
eliminating the need to choose between rules and standards. The 
analysis is presented in three sections. First, we briefly review the 
distinction between rules and standards and outline the cost choices 
presented by the dichotomy. Second, we set out our core theory that 
technology will fundamentally change those cost choices. We provide 
two examples to demonstrate how predictive and communication 
technologies will pave the way for micro-directives that capture the 
benefits of both rules and standards. Third, we discuss how the 
emergence of micro-directives can take place through different 
branches of lawmaking or can be driven by private actors with access 
to predictive technology. 
A. Background: Rules and standards 
Rules are precise and ex ante in nature. Rules indicate to an 
individual whether certain behavior will violate or comply with the 
law. When a rule is enacted, effort must be undertaken by lawmakers 
to give full and precise content to the law before the individuals act. 
Standards, on the other hand, are imprecise when they are enacted.15 
The exact content of the law comes after an individual acts, as judges 
and other adjudicators determine whether the individual’s specific 
behavior in a particular context violates the standard. 
Generally, lawmakers incur both error costs and decision costs 
when enacting a law. Error costs arise when a law is over- or under-
inclusive.16 The law allows behavior that should be prohibited, or 
prohibits behavior that should be allowed. Errors can be reduced as 
lawmakers exert greater effort to get the law right. But this requires 
information and deliberation. Reducing error costs imposes decision 
costs on the lawmakers. Additionally, regulated individuals face a cost 
in figuring out whether their behavior complies with the law. When 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Standards are found wherever vague and ambiguous terms such as 
“reasonable,” “material,” or “excessive” are used in the law. See, Schauer, supra note 
2, at 804-05; Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 NEW 
ZEALAND L. REV. 303, 306-309 (2003). 
16 McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 1031. 
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the application of the law to a particular situation cannot be easily 
predicted, the individual incurs cost of legal uncertainty. 
Error, decision, and uncertainty costs arise in different ways for 
rules and standards. The classic models in the rules-versus-standards 
literature conclude that, for several reasons, standards tend to perform 
better when the behavior of the regulated actors is infrequent and 
heterogeneous.17 
First, when behavior of regulated actors is infrequent, standards 
generate lower decision costs because the content of the law only needs 
to be decided in the infrequent event that the relevant context actually 
arises. Rules, on the other hand, require ex ante decisions about all 
future possible scenarios. Where behavior is infrequent and 
heterogeneous, lawmakers must make many more decisions if they 
want to write rules that are as precise in application as a standard 
that is adjudicated ex post would be. Rules do, however, impose lower 
decision costs when behavior is frequent and homogeneous. Economies 
of scale kick in and a law need only be enacted once rather than 
litigated over and over again.18 
Second, error costs for standards are lower when behavior is 
infrequent and heterogeneous because the adjudicator determining the 
content of the law ex post has more information than the ex ante 
lawmaker. The adjudicator has additional context not available to the 
ex ante lawmaker and has the benefit of hindsight in identifying which 
factors are relevant.  
On the other hand, adjudicator competency and bias complicate this 
simple model of error costs.19 Ex post adjudication may suffer from 
hindsight bias20 and from biases based on the personal characteristics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven M. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law in ALAN 
J. AUERBACH & MARTIN FELDSTEIN (EDS), HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, Vol. 3, 
Ch. 25, 1744-45.  
18 Strict application of the doctrine of precedent also introduces economies of 
scale for standards, but it does so in a way that turns the standard into a rule. See 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897); 
Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 303 (2013). 
19 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 2; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
(1991); see also Kaplow, supra note 1, at 609 (discussing institutional competence 
generally). 
20 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging 
in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1523-27 (1998); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2013). 
	   	   	  
	   9	  
of particular individuals.21 Such biases can manifest themselves in 
arbitrariness, political favoritism, covert influence, inconsistency, and 
discretionary justice 22  even when judges believe they are being 
unbiased.23 
Ex ante lawmakers and regulators may, of course, also be biased.24 
But the biases exhibited in ex post adjudication are particularly costly. 
Hindsight bias is more pervasive and difficult to minimize for ex post 
adjudication. Additional biases based on personal characteristics of an 
individual are also more likely for ex post adjudication and may be 
particularly pernicious and harmful to social objectives.25 The presence 
of biased adjudicators, thus, alters the error-cost trade offs between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & 
Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1195 (2009) (finding evidence of judicial bias based on race); see also Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006) 
(discussing implicit biases that individuals hold against disadvantaged groups).  
22 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (finding that political preference, race, gender, and other 
demographic characteristics sometimes have effects on judicial judgments); Anthony 
Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 9 (2013) 
(finding that judges in California decide unconscionability cases inconsistently with 
precedent). See generally, Jeffrey A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in ROBERT E. GOODIN 
(ED.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (2011).  
It has been argued that these flaws of judges may be partially responsible for the 
increased flight to agency regulation over the past twenty to thirty years, in spite of 
the many well-recognized and well-documented flaws of regulators and economic 
costs of regulation. ANDREI SHLEIFER, THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF 
REGULATION (2012); see also Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, An Activity 
Generating Theory of Regulation, 56 J. L. & ECON 1 (2013) (modeling the choice 
between ex ante regulation and ex post judging where courts commit errors). 
23 See Rachlinski et al, supra note 21 (exploring the effects of unconscious or 
implicit biases); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 970-71 (same); and Kahneman, 
supra note 20. 
24 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000) (noting the lack of attention to the behavioral biases of 
regulators); Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
25 For our purposes, the important observation will be that machine-created rules 
are less likely to be biased than humans in making rules or applying standards. Our 
analysis suggests that given a legislative goal, machines will more faithfully 
implement that objective. See infra Part II. It is possible, still, that judges are de-
biasing bad legislative policy (though some empirical evidence suggests otherwise). 
In that case, judges have the power to override and influence policy in a way that 
may be socially beneficial. That power will be lost as standards die. We address these 
issues in Part III. 
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rules and standards and weakens any claims that standards have 
lower error costs.  
A third cost comparison is also relevant when assessing the relative 
merits of rules and standards: the uncertainty cost imposed on the 
regulated actor in understanding whether her behavior complies with 
the law. Uncertainty about the content of a law is greater with 
standards than with simple rules. When regulated by a simple rule, an 
individual will more likely know whether her behavior is allowed or 
prohibited.26 When regulated by a standard, on the other hand, the 
individual does not know how any particular judge with wide 
discretion will apply the standard to the facts. She may not know what 
behavior a judge will consider reasonable.  
The choice between using a rule or a standard to achieve a 
particular policy objective is therefore a question of weighing and 
trading off these costs. We predict that advances in technology will 
fundamentally change that tradeoff. 
B. Technology will facilitate the emergence of micro-directives as a new 
form of law 
Two types of technology will lead to the death of rules and 
standards and the rise of micro-directives: predictive technology and 
communication technology. The first will facilitate lawmakers’ efforts 
to craft precise ex ante context-specific rules that provide the nuance 
and specificity traditionally associated with standards. The second will 
allow for the translation of those nuanced and specific laws into simple 
directives that are communicated to the regulated actors in a timely 
manner.  
Predictive Technology. Predictive technology, driven by ever 
increasing computational capacity, will allow lawmakers to sculpt 
more perfect ex ante laws. 27  Computation power is growing at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This assumes that judges (and juries) follow rules. They may, however, import 
exceptions that turn rules into standards – or ignore the rules altogether. See 
Schauer, supra note 15, at 312-314; Schauer, supra note 2, at 807. For the most part 
we bracket the possibility of such rule nullification. But it is worth noting that the 
developments we explore make nullification less likely as well. See infra Part III.A 
(discussing the diminished capacity for judges to influence and change legal 
substance and policy). This is yet another way that law will become more rule based 
from the perspective of the regulated individual.  
27 In a different context, Professor Michael Abramowicz identified the power of 
predictive decisionmaking to “take[] advantage of the best of both the world of 
standards and the world of rules.” Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 
92 VA. L. REV. 69, 74 (2006). Our analysis is consistent with and builds on 
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exponential rates. The consistent trend of the last fifty years suggests 
that that power will, by the end of this century, be more than one 
trillion times greater than what it is today.28 With even a fraction of 
that processing power, tomorrow’s computers will be able to gather and 
analyze more facts than any human lawmaker or judge. Lawmakers 
will be able to direct a machine to analyze massive data instantly to 
predict which rules can precisely achieve a policy objective.  
Relying on the machines to observe and analyze more relevant 
facts, lawmakers will make better predictions about the impact of a 
law and will face reduced error costs. Lawmakers will no longer have 
to think up rules to enact laws. Judges will no longer have to examine 
citizens’ decisions on a case-by-case basis in order to apply laws. And 
the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of 
judges introducing bias or incompetence. Of course, the calibration 
need not be perfect, it only needs to be better than the calibration 
associated with the alternatives of legislated rules and adjudicated 
standards. 
As a practical matter, the result will be a new hybrid form of law 
that is both rule and standard. The lawmaker can set a broad 
objective, which might look like a standard. But the predictive 
technology will take the standard and engineer a vast catalog of 
context-specific rules for every scenario. But that is only the first half 
of the story.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Abramowicz’s important insight. When the power of prediction that he identified is 
harnessed and amplified by technological advances and coupled with new 
communication technologies, the lawmaking process fundamentally changes.   
28 See infra Part II.A.2. This estimate is based on a trend known as Moore’s Law. 
See generally Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated 
Circuits, ELECTRONICS 114, April 19, 1965 (setting out the premise of Moore’s law); 
Mark Lundstrom, Moore’s Law Forever? 299 SCIENCE 210, 210 (2003) (explaining 
Moore’s Law and its implications for electronic systems); see also McGinnis & 
Wasick, supra note 1 at 1040 (describing Moore’s Law).  
29  The discussion of predictive technology here and throughout this article 
assumes a consequentialist approach to law. For a consequentialist, the content of 
the law is driven by a prediction of the outcome of behavior. For non-consequentialist 
theories, the use of the technology is slightly different. But the trend toward micro-
directives will likely be the same. For example, imagine that a lawmaker wants to 
prohibit certain behavior she deems immoral regardless of the consequences of that 
behavior. She does not want to list out all permutations of immorality. So a rule will 
not work. Instead, she can start with a standard – immoral activity is prohibited – 
and then identify samples of immoral behavior to feed into a machine. The machine 
can then use analytic and pattern recognition technology to determine whether other 
new scenarios would be deemed immoral by the lawmaker. We discuss below a 
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Communication Technology. In the second half, the communication 
technology will simplify that context-specific catalog of rules into clear 
micro-directives for the regulated individuals. Without that 
simplification, the catalog of rules would be too complex and pose 
significant compliance challenges. It would be impossible for people to 
learn, remember, and process all of the requirements contained in the 
catalog. But advances in communication technology will produce micro-
directives that reduce or eliminate those compliance costs and prevent 
uncertainty costs that might otherwise arise.  
The mechanism for translation is straightforward. Communication 
technology will gather and transmit information about the scenario in 
which the individual finds herself,30 identify the applicable rule from 
the vast catalog, and then translate that into a simple directive that is 
communicated back to the individual when she needs it. In this way, 
micro-directives will turn hundreds or thousands of context-specific 
machine-generated rules into simple directives that are easy to 
understand and follow. The law controlling a particular scenario may 
take into account hundreds or thousands of factors; 31  but the 
individual will receive a simple command like a red or green light. 
When the output from the predictive technology is translated into a 
micro-directive, citizens will be able to act as if they are taking into 
account more relevant factors than are humanly possible.32 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
similar process of pattern recognition for the question of pornography that a 
lawmaker knows is pornography when she sees it.  See infra Part II.A.2.  
30 We include this fact-gathering function in our analysis of communication 
technology because the key innovation is the communication of the factual scenario 
from the specific context to the analytic process. The technology facilitating this 
communication is likely to be the same or related to the technology facilitating the 
communication (in the other direction) of the final micro-directive from the process to 
the individual. 
31 To the extent that certain factors like race and gender are considered out-of-
bounds, the machines can be programmed to ignore those factors. Indeed, it is easier 
for a machine to affirmatively ignore a prohibited factor than for a human. 
32 These micro-directives share some important characteristics with McGinnis 
and Wasick’s “dynamic rules.” McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 1039-45. Both can 
be very precisely calibrated to specific conditions. But McGinnis and Wasick envision 
that at least the algorithm is “fixed by a rule” that must be changed if the “world may 
change in a way that makes another weighting of factors achieve the legislature’s 
original objective.” Id. at 1047-48. We suggest instead that one of the core functions 
of a micro-directive is the ability to learn from data and automatically update the 
weighting factors the way a judge would update her application of a standard. In this 
way micro-directives are not rules. They update automatically and continuously to 
account for such changes in the weighting of factors. But unlike standards they can 
be communicated ex ante with certainty. 
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* * * 
 
To summarize, these technologies will combine to do the following. 
First, they will take a standard-like policy objective, analyze its 
application in all possible contexts, and create a vast catalog of legal 
rules – each of which is tailored to best achieve the objective in a 
specific scenario. Second, when a regulated actor is in any actual 
scenario, the technologies will search the vast catalog and identify the 
specific rules that are applicable. Third, they will translate those rules 
into a simple micro-directive on how the regulated actor can comply 
with the law. Fourth, they will communicate that micro-directive to the 
regulated actor in a timely and efficient manner.  
 
C. Examples 
To demonstrate the point, we present two stylized examples.  
1. Example 1: Predictive technology in medical diagnosis 
In this subsection, we provide an example that demonstrates how 
improved predictive technology – technology that allows lawmakers to 
better predict the outcomes of actions – will foster micro-directives. 
Suppose you are a legislator. You are charged with determining 
when doctors should be liable for performing a risky surgery on a 
patient. How can you best regulate doctors’ behavior? How can you 
best draft a statute that will help doctors understand when their 
behavior complies with or violates the law? How many of the specific 
details should you include in the statute? How many of these details 
can be postponed until we have more information about how doctors 
behave in each case? 
One option is to provide doctors with a clear and simple bright-line 
rule that dictates the circumstances under which surgery should or 
should not be conducted. This simple rule provides great certainty to 
the doctors and is easily enforced; either a doctor complied with the 
rule or she didn’t. A simple, precise ex ante rule would be your 
preferred method if similar patients frequently present with the same 
symptoms.33 Under these circumstances, a rule would be preferred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Kaplow, supra 1, at 573-77 (discussing the importance of frequency in 
assessing the desirability of rules). 
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because the content of the law can be established just once and there 
are enormous benefits from economies of scale. 
But a doctor’s decision to operate on a patient frequently turns on 
many different factors. A “one size fits all” rule here would likely not be 
optimal. Any simple bright-line rule you enact will likely be over-
inclusive and under-inclusive compared to an optimal decision rule. 
There will be some patients who receive surgery who do not need it 
(type I errors); there will also be other patients who do not receive 
surgery who do need it (type II errors).  
To overcome these errors, you may try to write a more complex rule. 
To formulate this rule, you may try to think up many different 
scenarios, where you imagine different types of patients presenting 
with various symptoms. A complex rule is preferred if the cost of 
thinking and writing the rules is very low and the cost of doctors 
understanding and being able to comply with such a complex rule is 
also low. But it is often very costly for legislators to think up and write 
down all contingencies. Further, the more complex the rule you write, 
the more difficult it becomes for a doctor to follow.34  
Rather than implement a rule, another option you have is to enact a 
standard and evaluate the conduct of a doctor after the decision to 
operate (or not operate) has been made. That is, the decision to hold a 
doctor liable would be made once all the circumstances of the 
particular case are known.35 For example, the legal standard might 
stipulate that all doctors must take “reasonable care” in determining 
whether to operate on patients. This provides doctors with greater 
flexibility to decide whether or not the patient needs surgery.36 But it 
also provides an ex post adjudicator with the flexibility and discretion 
to determine what is meant by “reasonable.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules,11 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 150, 151 (1995) (modeling the trade-off between complexity and regulated 
actors ability to comply); Diver, supra note 3, at 73-74 (noting the trade-off between 
precision and ease of applying and following a law). 
35 As Henry Hart and Albert Sacks note: “The wise draftsman . . . asks himself, 
how many of the details of this settlement ought to be postponed to another day, 
when the decisions can be more wisely and efficiently and perhaps more readily 
made?” HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 157 (1958). 
36 John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus 
Standards in Nursing Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995). 
Comparing nursing homes in rule-based United States and standard-based 
Australia, Braithwaite, et al. conclude that the flexibility of standards in Australia 
allows health care professionals to respond to their patients’ needs better than 
professionals merely applying strict rules. Id. 
	   	   	  
	   15	  
If a patient suffers harm as a result of a doctor’s decision, then a 
judge can look at all the facts as they actually occurred and make an 
informed decision as to whether the doctor took reasonable care. A 
standard would be better than a rule if patients and symptoms are 
heterogeneous and the likelihood of two patients with the same 
background and symptoms is very low.  
There are, of course, costs associated with implementing and 
enforcing a standard. First, the cost of deciding each case is not zero. 
There are decision costs of learning the best course of action the doctor 
should have taken in the circumstances. Second, a judge may apply the 
standard incorrectly, either due to error or to bias. Third – and 
importantly – unlike a clear rule, a vague standard creates a great 
deal of uncertainty for the doctor. A doctor may not know how a judge 
will decide any given case; further, different judges may decide 
inconsistently. If doctors are risk averse, a vague law can chill socially 
desirable behavior,37 and the uncertainty may generate considerable 
expense in the form of compliance costs.  
But in our hypothetical situation, let’s suppose that a standard is 
optimal. Let’s assume that the question of surgery rarely arises and 
that patients are highly diverse, both in terms of health backgrounds 
and in terms of the symptoms they present. Formulating detailed rules 
that cover all those situations and being able to communicate these 
complex rules to doctors would be difficult; and a simple rule would 
create high error costs. Case-by-case adjudication is not costless but it 
is preferred in our example because the infrequent cost of determining 
the content of the law ex post is lower than the costs of trying to 
specify the law up front in all potential situations, many of which will 
never arise. 
Now let’s examine how technology will eliminate this tradeoff 
between rules and standards. Suppose that you learn of the existence 
of a diagnostic machine that is designed to predict when surgery is 
required. The machine takes into account relevant facts about the 
patient38 – her history, the symptoms, and other relevant information 
– to provide a best guess as to whether the patient requires surgery.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 6, at 298-99 (concluding that uncertainty 
can reduce socially desirable behavior). Recent work has suggested that legal 
uncertainty even distorts the behavior of risk neutral parties. Scott Baker & Alex 
Raskolnikov, Information, Strategy, and Optimal Responses to Legal Uncertainty, 
(2015) (unpublished manuscript).  
38 In practice, the machine would actually take into account relevant information 
about the doctor as well, such as his track record with surgeries of the relevant type. 
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You, the legislator, have access to this machine. How does this 
predictive machine affect your decision to enact a rule or a standard? 
The answer turns on two factors. First, how good is the machine at 
accurately predicting outcomes? If the predictive technology is very 
powerful and the machine is able to provide precise and accurate 
information, then this points in favor of using the machine to create a 
rule, rather than relying on a judge to adjudicate a standard. Second, 
can this information be easily communicated to a doctor? That is, can 
lawmakers provide the doctor with timely notice of what behavior will 
comply with or violate the law?  
Consider two scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: A terrible predictor 
In scenario 1, the machine is very poor at predicting when a 
patient requires surgery. The machine essentially 
randomizes patients for surgery. The machine generates both 
type I and type II errors. One might think of the technology 
as a simple coin toss: heads for surgery, tails for no surgery.  
 
Scenario 2: A perfect predictor 
In scenario 2, the machine can predict with 100% accuracy 
whether a patient requires surgery or not. The machine 
instantly examines the patient’s history and symptoms, 
analyzes millions of prior cases, and reads all articles in 
medical journals. It then makes a perfect prediction. It is 
better than any human at determining whether it is optimal 
to have surgery. There are no type I errors: patients who do 
not need surgery are not designated for surgery. There are no 
type II errors: patients who need surgery are designated for 
surgery. 
 
Under scenario 1, the technology should have no effect on your 
decision as a regulator to implement a rule or a standard. You should 
implement a standard and determine liability on a case-by-case basis, 
learning more about doctors’ behavior over time.  
Under scenario 2, however, the optimal form of the law will be 
different. The machine’s predictions provide the exact content of the 
law. The machine provides micro-directives for each and every 
scenario. The over- and under-inclusivity associated with simple rules 
have disappeared. There are no errors (type I or type II) in this 
scenario. And the costs incurred in thinking up and formulating such a 
complex rule have already been incurred in the development of this 
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machine.39  The justification for relying on ex post adjudication of 
standards – reducing the error costs of rules – is gone. Further, we 
have an added benefit of eliminating uncertainty for the doctors. If 
they follow the directive of the machine, they know they will not be 
held liable. 
The emergence of micro-directives and the death of rules and 
standards as we know them do not rely on perfect predictive 
technology. Rather, as the predictive technology gets better and better, 
we move away from the world of scenario 1 and towards the world of 
scenario 2. There will come a point where the technology is good 
enough that the costs of using a micro-directive are sufficiently low so 
that there is no longer any need to use traditional rules or standards.  
A caveat is necessary. This tipping point can only be realized if the 
rules generated by the machine can be easily communicated to doctors. 
That is, the legislator has to be able to provide the doctor with a quick 
and simple answer to the question of whether the patient requires 
surgery.  
Doctors would find it difficult to follow complex computer-derived 
rules. Regulated actors have neither the desire nor the time to thumb 
through thousands of pages of legislation and understand complex 
algorithms. Rather, lawmakers need some form of technology to allow 
a doctor to easily input all the relevant facts about a patient and 
receive an instant output that dictates whether or not the patient 
requires surgery. One might imagine a web-based program or mobile 
app, where the doctor can quickly and easily enter all relevant facts, 
submit the information, and instantly receive a binding ex ante 
opinion. Such technology is emerging and will be able to transform the 
complex rules generated by machine prediction into a simple directive 
that the doctor can follow. 40 The costs to the doctor in understanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 In reality many of the costs for developing the machine may have been 
incurred by industry for the non-legal benefits that the machine brings. In that 
sense, the marginal costs of using it for law are negligible. Moreover, even if the 
machine had to be developed specifically for law, that is a fixed cost that can be 
averaged across all applications when calculating the per rule cost. 
40 See, e.g., Ron Winslow, Patients Seeking Alternatives to Statins May Undergo 
Rigorous Vetting, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-
seeking-alternatives-to-statins-may-undergo-rigorous-vetting-1438029636  
(describing a software application that guides doctors through the decision to put 
patients on non-statin cholesterol treatment); Robert McMillan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, 
IBM Crafts a Role for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-crafts-a-role-for-artificial-intelligence-in-medicine-
1439265840 (describing IBM’s planned move into artificially intelligent diagnostics 
for cancer and other diseases); Joseph Walker, Can a Smartphone Tell if You’re 
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the complex rule will be dramatically reduced as this technology 
improves. Even though the rule will be highly complex and based on a 
sophisticated algorithm, from the perspective of the doctor, the rule 
will be simple: operate or do not operate.41 We explore communication 
technology further in our second example. 
2. Example 2: Communication technology in traffic laws 
In this subsection, we highlight the way improved communication 
technology will facilitate micro-directives. Machines can almost 
instantaneously gather information, process it, and produce a useable 
output that directs how individuals should behave.  
Traffic lights provide an example of this type of technology. They 
communicate the content of a law to drivers at little cost and with 
great effect. This notice technology – combined with technology for 
predicting traffic patterns and driver behavior – creates an 
environment where lawmakers are able to replace vague standards 
and simplistic rules with crisp and increasingly complex micro-
directives.  
Electric traffic lights communicate to drivers precisely when they 
are required to stop and when they may proceed. Traffic lights appear 
to generate very simple rules: if the light is red, you must stop; if the 
light is green, you may go. But these rules are simple only from the 
perspective of the driver. From the perspective of the lawmakers, the 
underlying rules are complex. The simplest underlying rule may 
dictate that cars must stop during regular, alternating time intervals. 
In more complex examples, the time intervals can vary by intersection, 
direction of traffic, or time of day. 
If promulgated without traffic lights, these rules would be far too 
complex. Drivers would have to consult tables that matched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Depressed?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-
smartphone-tell-if-youre-depressed-1420499238 (describing tests of a new generation 
of “health-surveillance technologies” that can gather information to diagnose illness 
and assess physical and mental well-being). 
41 It may seem odd at first that lawmakers are in the business of diagnostic 
technology. But this is no different from what judges do in medical litigation. Judges 
hear expert testimony and decide ex post whether certain behavior was reasonable. 
In our example, lawmakers just use expert technology to do that ex ante. It is true 
that the role of the doctor has changed – diagnostic judgment is less important – but 
that is the inevitable result of advances in diagnostic technology. Our point is simply 
that in the hands of lawmakers the technology also changes the role of law. When the 
technology is only available to the private actors – the doctors in this example – then 
the evolution of rules into standards takes a slightly different path. We discuss this 
infra Part I.D. 
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intersections, times, and directions with prescribed intervals of 
stopping. They would also have to consult precise clocks to determine 
when the intervals start and end.  
The traffic light translates complexities into a simple command. 
From the drivers’ point of view, the lights provide a directive that is 
easily understood. And the lawmaker’s cost of giving notice is low.42 
Electric traffic lights take advantage of significant economies of scale 
that enable lawmakers to make complex rules, translate them into 
simple directives, and deliver notice of the required behavior to many 
drivers.  
Moreover, while the command of the traffic light remains simple, 
the substance of the underlying rules is becoming more complex. 
Predictive analysis facilitates this process. Stopping at a red light 
when an intersection is deserted is wasteful and costly.43 That rule is 
over-inclusive. It would be better if the directive to the driver could 
change depending on the circumstances (as it would with a standard). 
To address this, traffic lights in some jurisdictions already contain 
sensors that detect and predictively analyze traffic flow and adjust the 
timing of red and green lights accordingly.44 Some traffic lights contain 
detectors allowing emergency service vehicles to “preempt” the signal 
and expedite their journey.45 In the near future, these systems will 
take into account more variables, such as the number of cars, speed of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 These stop-go rules would be far more costly if humans operated traffic lights. 
Indeed, the first gas-powered traffic light used in 1868 in London, United Kingdom, 
was operated by humans. The Man who Gave Us Traffic Lights, BBC (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/nottingham/content/articles/2009/07/16/john_peake_knight_traf
fic_lights_feature.shtml. 
43 There are other potential costs such as the increase in the number of “rear end” 
traffic accidents caused by cars braking as lights turn yellow. We argue that these 
costs will also die out as the rule becomes more context specific.  
44 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red 
Light, N.Y. TIMES (April 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-
gridlock-los-angeles-synchronizes-every-red-light.html (describing Los Angeles’s $400 
million system of synchronized traffic sensors aimed at controlling traffic flow and 
reducing gridlock); see also Diane Cardwell, Copenhagen Lighting the Way to 
Greener, More Efficient Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/business/energy-environment/copenhagen-
lighting-the-way-to-greener-more-efficient-cities.html (noting Copenhagen’s use of 
lights and sensors aimed at easing mobility and cutting use of fuel as well as 
achieving more ambitious goals). 
45  US FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SIGNAL PREEMPTION FOR 
EMERGENCY VEHICLE A CROSS—CUTTING STUDY, (2006) 
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/jpodocs/repts_te/14097_files/14097.pdf, at 1-1 (noting the signal 
preemption programs in various jurisdictions). 
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travel, or type of intersection. They might even take into account 
personal characteristics of a vehicle’s driver or passengers.46 In the 
not-so-distant future, a traffic-light system may know that a passenger 
in a regular vehicle requires medical attention and give the rushing 
driver a series of green lights all the way to the hospital. 
The progress of traffic lights shows how lawmakers can define 
optimal policy outcomes (travel times, accident rates) and machines 
can generate a catalog of rules and exceptions to achieve those 
outcomes. And yet – even while the lawmakers enact a standard and 
the machines generate an increasingly complex catalog of rules 
underpinning the operation of traffic lights – from the perspective of 
the driver, the law will remain constant and straightforward: a simple 
stop-go directive.  
This phenomenon is not limited to traffic law. The forces at work 
here are ubiquitous. The invention and mass adoption of Internet 
technology has facilitated instantaneous and cheap communication 
between individuals across all domains.47 It also, importantly, allows 
for immediate communication between lawmakers and individuals. 
D. The different channels leading to the death of rules and standards 
We have, until now, spoken generally of lawmaking by a 
legislature. That is by no means the only avenue. Micro-directives can 
emerge through two other channels: (1) non-legislative (regulatory or 
judicial) law making; and (2) private use of technology by regulated 
actors. We discuss each in turn.  
1. The production of micro-directives by non-legislative lawmakers 
Legislatures are not the only lawmakers with access to technology. 
In many cases, the lawmaking power is entrusted to a regulator or 
enforcement agent. In other cases, judges make law.48 Those entities 
can also use technology to create and communicate micro-directives to 
regulated actors. 
Regulatory micro-directives. It is likely to be more politically 
feasible for regulators to develop micro-directives than legislators. The 
legislative path to enacting a computer algorithm is complicated. Pork 
barrel and horse-trading amendments to an algorithm do not make for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (noting the value of personalized laws).  
47 See infra Part II. 
48 From the legislature’s perspective, the delegation to an agency or enforcer 
takes the form of a standard. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 310. The legislature sets a 
broad goal and gives the agency the power to fill the content of rules. 
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successful programming. On the other hand, a regulator tasked with 
enforcing some legislated standard might easily adopt an algorithm-
driven system of micro-directives.49  
The pressures on a budget-constrained regulatory body will push 
the agency toward adopting technology. Likewise, trends towards cost-
benefit analysis and requirements that regulations be shown to be cost 
justified 50  are likely to accelerate agency adoption. Predictive 
technology facilitates such cost-benefit analysis, reduces uncertainty 
costs to the regulated actors, and cuts down on ex post adjudication 
costs.  
Congress could enact a standard and direct that these standards be 
administered by an algorithm-based system of micro-directives 
overseen by regulators or the regulators could themselves decide to 
implement the standard in that manner.51 
Advance tax rulings provide an example of an area for regulators to 
use micro-directives.52  As it currently stands, taxpayers may seek 
clarification of vague standards in the law by asking the tax authority 
to examine their tax arrangements and determine whether they 
comply with the code.53 A tax payer may ask the tax authority to give a 
ruling on a matter that takes into account a number of factors such as: 
Am I a resident of the United States for tax purposes? Or, are my 
workers independent contractors or are they employees?54 
These advance tax rulings bind the tax authority to the tax 
arrangements set out in the ruling, but only for the one specific 
taxpayer.55 Essentially the taxpayer is asking the tax authority to turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 1042 (discussing the use of algorithms by 
rule makers); cf. Schauer, supra note 2, 310-12. 
50 See generally, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) (exploring the rise of cost-benefit analysis in 
administrative agencies). 
51 This is not the same as traditional convergence predictions where rules become 
standards or standards become rules. Schauer, supra note 2, 310-12. With micro-
directives laws take a new form that has some of the benefits of rules (more 
certainty) and some of the benefits of standards (better calibration) but fewer of the 
costs associated with either.  
52 See generally Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Advance Tax Rulings, 29 VA. TAX. REV. 137, 144-47 (2009) (describing how 
advance tax rulings reduce uncertainty); CARLO ROMANO, ADVANCE TAX RULING AND 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW (2002). 
53 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (2002); Givati, supra note 52, at 149-52 (outlining the 
process and implications of obtaining an advance tax ruling). 
54 ROMANO, supra note 52, at 80. 
55 In the United States, these rulings (“private letter rulings”) are “binding on the 
IRS if the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the 
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an ex post standard into a specific rule that applies solely to her 
circumstances. These advance rulings have a variety of benefits. Most 
prominently, they provide greater legal certainty to the taxpayer.56 
They eliminate the uncertainty costs of the standard. 57  But such 
rulings can be costly to generate.58 The tax authority is essentially 
engaged in personalized rulemaking. It is incurring high ex ante 
decision costs by enacting a rule that applies to just one taxpayer.59 
Now imagine the tax authority could create a system where a 
taxpayer simply turns to a machine to answer her tax questions. She 
could, for example, turn to an agency website or a mobile app. She 
could ask the machine whether her tax arrangements will expose her 
to liability and the machine could quickly read the entire tax code, all 
relevant cases, all associated regulations, and all relevant advisory 
opinions. The machine could immediately provide an answer to the 
taxpayer’s question.60  
The tax authority, thus, could use this artificially intelligent 
machine to provide advance tax rulings. Depending on the underlying 
objective of the legislature, the tax authority could use the machine to 
identify optimal rules that allow it to generate more revenue with 
greater efficiency and fewer distortions on market behavior. It could 
use this technology very broadly to choose very specific rules that are 
highly calibrated to legislative objectives without introducing 
compliance costs that would otherwise be associated with such 
complexity.  
If regulators adopt these technologies, the answers provided by the 
tax authority would essentially become the red or green lights of tax 
law. Even though the underlying tax laws would be very complex, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
request and carries out the transaction as described.” Understanding IRS Guidance - 
A Brief Primer available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-
Brief-Primer; see also 26 CFR 601.201(a)(1) & (a)(2) & (l); Givati, supra note 52, at 
149-150.  
56 ROMANO, supra note 52, at 77-78. 
57 Givati, supra note 52, at 147. 
58 ROMANO, supra note 52, at 277-80. 
59 Givati, supra note 52, at 149. As a formal matter the rulings only resolve the 
relationship between the tax authority and one specific taxpayer. Further, they have 
no formal precedential effect for future taxpayers. As a practical matter, however, the 
tax authority is required to treat taxpayers consistently and so a de facto 
precedential value arises – but this does not rise to the level of a binding rule for all 
future cases. Id. (discussing the nuances of the precedential value of advance rulings 
and surveying the legal scholarship on the matter). 
60 For more on this process, see Benjamin Alarie, Cognitive Computing and the 
Future of Tax Law (unpublished manuscript) (2015). 
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directives provided to an individual would be simple. Any enforcement 
agent could adopt technology of this kind.61 As predictive technology 
makes it easier to automate such regulatory advance rulings and 
ensure their accuracy, they will become a common mechanism for the 
adoption of machine-generated micro-directives.62 
Judicial micro-directives. Aside from the legislator and the 
regulator, there is, of course, a third potential rulemaker: the judge. 
But, as they currently function, judges do not quite fit into this model 
of lawmaking. To be sure, judges could use artificial intelligence and 
big data to apply standards or complex rules.63 But judges are not – at 
least in a formal sense – regularly in the business of providing ex ante 
notice of the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The Securities and Exchange Commission has a program similar to advance 
tax rulings where it provides “No Action” letters that state that the staff will not 
recommend enforcement actions against the individual or entity seeking guidance. 
The letter has no binding effect on other individuals or entities and the SEC reserves 
the right to change its position. For the SEC’s statement on No Action letters see 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm. See also Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance 
on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and 
Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998) (describing the no-action letter 
process).  
62 There will be some areas in law where the provision of advance directives is 
problematic. Tax provides a salient example. For some things, the lawmaker and the 
individual have aligned incentives. The individual wants to comply with the 
lawmaker’s policy objectives and certainty makes compliance more likely. But for 
other things, the individual wants formal compliance with law but would prefer to 
avoid the policy objective. In other words, the individual is looking for a loophole. If 
the law provides a clear rule and the regulated individual would prefer to circumvent 
that rule, then certainty provides a road map for avoidance. See David A. Weisbach, 
Formalism the Tax law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999) (describing the use of “anti-
abuse” standards to deal with rule avoidance).  
In these spaces, in it is difficult to predict how micro-directives will fair. On the 
one hand, the use of micro-directive technology to craft a precise law may shrink the 
space for avoidance. After all, a perfectly calibrated law will provide no space for 
avoidance. On the other hand, if the law has any imperfection and the regulated 
individual has superior private technology, she may use the technology to find the 
imperfections and craft her behavior (such as creating elaborate tax avoidance 
mechanisms) to avoid application of the micro-directive. These arms race scenarios – 
where avoidance creates private benefits and private technology is in competition 
with the lawmakers’ technology – suggest areas where standards, such as the anti-
abuse standard, will survive to supplement micro-directives.  
63 Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12. (“Under certain circumstances, we 
want the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science of Big Data 
as a means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous contract 
or will.”). 
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For better or worse, advisory opinions are frowned upon by the 
American judicial system. Judges might use the predictive technology 
to refine the law ex post. But without notice to the regulated actors, 
those specific rulings impose some of the same costs as standards. For 
example, if judges announce that all negligence cases will be decided 
using a computer algorithm,64 a regulated actor without access to the 
algorithm would still be faced with nothing more than a standard that 
imposes uncertainty about how the judges will apply that standard. It 
would make little difference to the individual that the actual judge 
happens to be a computer.65  
Things change if the regulated actors have access to the algorithm 
that judges will use. In that world, the regulated actors can predict the 
outcome with precision. If judges commit to using a certain technology 
that is available to the public, that would be equivalent to providing 
advance rulings.66 This would essentially shift the judge’s role to that 
of ex ante regulators. While not implausible, we think the avenues of 
legislative and regulatory rulemaking will be more pervasive. 
There is another way that judges could be involved in the 
promulgation of micro-directives. Just as legislatures could set a broad 
policy objective and delegate the rulemaking to an agency, so too could 
the courts. In deciding cases, courts can announce a standard that 
blesses any rule that results from a process aimed at the correct policy 
objective and that takes into account the relevant factors. The agency 
could then create an algorithm that does exactly that. This “second-
order regulation” by the court would send a message to the agencies on 
how to design the algorithm to ensure compliance.67 Here again it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The hypothetical scenario is not as fanciful as it may sound. The algorithm 
here is just a more precise amalgamation of the expert opinions that courts routinely 
rely on in deciding cases. 
65 It is worth noting that ex post error and inconsistency costs are likely to be 
lower if the judge is using the algorithm. See the example of bail, infra Part II.A.2. 
66 In a slightly different but related context, one commentator has suggested that 
judges could bind themselves to textualist interpretations of statutes by using 
computers to derive the meaning of text. Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could 
IBM’s Watson Beat Courts at Their Own Game?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 87 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/judges-in-jeopardy-could-ibms-watson-beat-courts-at-
their-own-game. 
67 See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. 
REV. 205, 214 (2015) (defining a second-order judicial decision as one that “’states its 
obligations in terms of ultimate goals that must be achieved. The [agent] is then free 
to achieve those goals in any appropriate way’”) (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982)). This can be done for all standards 
including those that the court applies pursuant to the Constitution. See infra Part 
III. Rappaport’s example of the court’s second-order regulation of Fourth Amendment 
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would be the agencies and enforcers who have the ultimate 
responsibility for implementing the machine algorithm to promulgate 
micro-directives. 
2. An alternative path: Private use of technology by regulated actors 
Predictive technology will be available to private actors. And, in 
some cases, private actors may have more advanced proprietary 
technology than legislatures, regulators, or courts.68 Private use of 
predictive technology will lead to the emergence of micro-directives. 
There are two main ways this can occur.  
The first path is through the interplay of reasonableness, industry 
standards, and technology. In our medical example above, imagine 
that the machine that predicts medical outcomes is available not to 
lawmakers but only directly to doctors. As the technology becomes 
more accurate we can expect more and more doctors to use it. At some 
point, it is likely that courts will begin to deem it per se unreasonable 
to not use such advanced technology. Imagine an orthopedic practice 
today that did not use an x-ray machine69 or a colorectal specialist who 
refused to perform colonoscopies in diagnosing colon cancer. 70  As 
technology becomes more accurate and widespread, the likelihood that 
courts will base a reasonableness standard on the use of that 
technology increases. The proliferation of these technologies across 
industries will cause behavior that complies with standards to function 
exactly as if it were complying with a micro-directive promulgated by 
the predictive technology. 
The second path is a softer version of our main thesis. This path 
does not require lawmakers to use technology. Individuals can use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
searches, id., is an area where the death of rules and standards will be swift. 
Machine algorithms will be able to easily determine probable cause, exigent 
circumstances, bias of officers, and the like better than humans. 
68 For example, private traders of securities have technology that permits higher 
frequency trading than regulators can observe and monitor in real time. See Eric 
Budish, Peter Cramton, & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: 
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q. J. ECON. __ 
(forthcoming 2015.) 
69 Doctors have frequently been held negligent for failing to order x-rays. See, e.g., 
Rudick v. Prineville Mem. Hosp., 319 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1963) (x-rays would have 
revealed fractured vertebrae); Webb v. Lungstrum, 575 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1978) (x-rays 
would have revealed small metal fragment in wound); Betenbaugh v. Princeton 
Hosp., 235 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1967) (negligence found where doctor failed to order x-ray 
of the injured part of the spine). 
70 Doctors who failed to order a colonoscopy have been held negligent. See, e.g., 
Morse v. Davis, 965 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. of App. 2012). 
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predictive technology to provide predictions on how judges will apply a 
standard.71 In this way, technology improves on the role of lawyers as 
compliance advisors.72 When lawyers provide compliance advice, they 
are, in part, predicting how ex post adjudicators will apply a 
standard.73 As computers can gather and analyze more and more prior 
cases, they will outperform lawyers at this task. On first blush, this 
advance would appear to reduce the compliance cost of standards. But 
it does so in a way that effectively turns the standard into a micro-
directive, as it reduces the costs of legal uncertainty because it tells the 
individual exactly how to behave. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, a 
prediction of a judicial outcome is the law.”74 
 Advances in big data and artificial intelligence will spawn 
intelligent machines that can predict legal outcomes with great 
accuracy.75 In our traffic example, imagine that traffic is regulated 
only with yield signs that impose a reasonableness standard.76 But in 
this world, consumer technology has advanced to a stage where it can 
predict when a court will deem yielding to be required under the 
standard. This private technology provides a mechanism for informing 
the driver when she must stop under the law. The technology gathers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1 at 1033-39 (discussing the use of technology 
to predict judicial outcomes). 
72  See generally Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via Business 
Deregulation: Compliance Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 175 (1999) (exploring the role of lawyers as compliance officers); Michele 
DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1869, 1874–81 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult to distinguish between business and 
law in corporate practice); see also Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, 
Compliance Officer? Dream Job, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579250722114538750 
(examining the rise of compliance officers). 
73 On the law-and-economics of ex ante legal advice see Louis Kaplow & Steven 
M. Shavell, Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 306 (1992). See also Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory 
of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405 (2000) (discussing the law-and-economics 
literature of legal culture and legal strategy).  
 74 Holmes, supra note 18 at 461 (“The	  prophecies	  of	  what	  courts	  will	  do	  in	  fact	  .	  .	  .	  are	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  the	  law”).	  See	  also	  Abramowicz,	  supra	  note	  27. 
75 See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013) (exploring the power of big data to predict legal 
outcomes); see also Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (same). 
76 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws 89 § 9 (2013) (requiring that a driver at a yield sign 
slow to “a speed reasonable for the existing conditions” and stop “if required for 
safety”); 625 Ill. C.S. 5 § 11-904(c) (2015) (same); Pierce v. Coltraro, 252 So.2d 550, 
552-53 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (noting the standard that applies at a yield sign). 
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the relevant facts, applies the standard to those facts as a judge would, 
and provides predictive analysis.  
Even though we have standards and private technology, the 
resulting behavior looks as if we had public traffic lights with 
underlying complex rules. And compliance is as simple for the driver as 
it would be with a micro-directive. The driver simply gets a message 
saying stop. She does not have to even take mental note of the 
underlying facts. As technology makes ex post adjudication more 
predictable, citizens treat a prediction as a rule. They receive directives 
ex ante and have little uncertainty about how the law requires them to 
behave.  
This may lead lawmakers to simply enact those predictions as law. 
It is possible, though, that lawmakers may deem fully predictable ex 
post adjudication to be the satisfactory equivalent of a micro-directives 
and not take the final step to formalize the micro-directives into law. 
But from the individual’s perspective the transformation will be 
already complete. Drivers will know to stop when the technology in 
their car gives a signal – the equivalent of a red light.77 
II. FEASIBILITY  
In this Part, we examine the feasibility of using technology to 
generate micro-directives. The Part is divided in two main sections. 
First, we examine the feasibility of predictive technology. We look at 
examples where big data and artificial intelligence have been used to 
generate better predictions and insights than humans ever could 
provide, and we look to where the technology is headed. We look at 
how such predictive technology has dramatically diminished the need 
for human discretion.  
Second, we examine the feasibility of communication technology. 
For the most part, this technology is already here and steadily 
improving. Mobile devices are becoming our first port of call for 
information. Individuals can easily and quickly communicate with 
other individuals, and – more importantly for our argument – 
lawmakers can easily and quickly communicate with regulated actors.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  It is possible that judges, knowing about the predictive technology will 
(consciously or unconsciously) respond by changing their behavior. If that were true, 
and assuming that advanced algorithms could not account for the changes when 
making predictions, that would suggest that technology for predicting judicial 
outcomes would lag behind other predictive technology in effectiveness. This 
alternative path toward the death of standards would, therefore, be less likely than 
the paths through legislative and regulatory rulemaking. 
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A. The feasibility of predictive technology 
There are two key takeaways from this section: (1) machines are, in 
many areas, already better at predicting outcomes and behavior than 
any human; and (2) this technology is improving so rapidly that the 
superiority of machines in predicting outcomes will continue to grow at 
an exponential rate.  
Machines can process billions of data points instantly to determine 
an optimal course of action. Even the most competent, objective 
humans cannot compete with algorithms generated by big data and 
artificial intelligence. We are producing and analyzing ever-increasing 
stores of data that will provide the backbone of predictive technology. 
It may be difficult to envision these longer-term trends, but as Bill 
Gates has noted: “We always overestimate the change that will occur 
in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in 
the next ten.” 78  One can only imagine the extent to which we 
underestimate the change that will occur in the next twenty years, or 
by the end of this century.  
In this section, we first explore how technological developments will 
improve the prediction of human behavior by better understanding and 
analyzing millions of hypothetical situations. We foreshadow the 
future growth of cognitive computing, artificial intelligence, and 
evolutionary algorithms to show how these powerful new technologies 
will facilitate the emergence of micro-directives. We then look at how 
human discretion is being replaced by computer-based rules in all 
professions and argue that law is no different.  
1. The power of predictive technology 
Big data and artificial intelligence have reached a stage where 
likely outcomes can already be predicted in many aspects of human 
life.79 By the end of the last century, computing machines were able to 
defeat the best grandmasters in chess.80 A decade later, an artificially 
intelligent machine destroyed the grandmasters of the television trivia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD (1996). 
79 See generally Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the 
Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). 
80 In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated Garry Kasparov 3½ games to 2½. For 
commentary on and descriptions of the match, see BRUCE PANDOLFINI, KASPAROV AND 
DEEP BLUE: THE HISTORIC CHESS MATCH BETWEEN MAN AND MACHINE (1997). 
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show, Jeopardy!81 Indeed, machines outperform humans in many areas 
of life.82 They can predict consumers’ taste83 and advise clients on 
financial opportunities. 84  In the field of medicine, computers can 
analyze images and predict the likelihood of cancer.85  
But today’s use of big data and algorithms to predict outcomes is 
just the beginning. The capacity of computers to process information 
and collect and store data continues to explode.86 The Director of 
Engineering at Google, Ray Kurzweil, recently noted: “There’s a very 
smooth exponential increase in the price-performance of computing 
going back to the 1890 census.”87  As economist Professor William 
Nordhaus notes, the increase in computer power over the course of the 
twentieth century was “phenomenal,” 88 improving manual computing 
power by a factor of between 1.7 trillion and 76 trillion times from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-
watson.html?pagewanted=all.  
82 See MARTIN FORD, THE RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A 
JOBLESS FUTURE (2015). 
83  See generally THOMAS W. MILLER, MODELING TECHNIQUES IN PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS: BUSINESS PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (2014). As an example, artificially 
intelligent machines can predict wine prices better than wine connoisseurs. See 
Quants and Quaffs, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), 
"http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21660405-artificial-
intelligence-may-beat-connoisseurship-quants-and-quaffs" 
Amazon, Netflix, and Match.com have all used machine learning algorithms to better 
understand consumers’ tastes.  
84 See Brad Power, Artificial Intelligence Is Almost Ready for Business, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (March 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/artificial-intelligence-is-almost-
ready-for-business. 
85  IBM’s Watson, the same artificially intelligent process that defeated the 
grandmasters of Jeopardy!, has been used in the medical context. See Carl Zimmer, 
Enlisting a Computer to Battle Cancers, One by One, N.Y. TIMES (March 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/science/enlisting-a-computer-to-battle-cancers-
one-by-one.html.  
86 See Martin Hilbert & Patricia Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity to 
Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60 (2011) (estimating 
the growth of computing power and capacity). See also, Data, Data Everywhere, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15557443. 
87  Ray Kurzweil on the Price-Performance of Computing, WALL ST. J. ONLINE 
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/video/ray-kurzweil-on-the-price-performance-of-
computing/C1F2B611-4B92-469C-AA33-3129587EC113.html.  
88 William D. Nordhaus, Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing, 67 
J. ECON. HIST. 128, 128 (2007). 
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1900-1999,89 with an explosive trend beginning only after the Second 
World War.90 
The growth in computational power has closely tracked “Moore’s 
Law” over the past fifty years.91 Moore’s Law is the observation that 
the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles 
approximately every two years. 92  This observation has proved 
remarkably accurate and is now used as a guide to understanding 
where computing will be in the future.93 If the trend continues, then 
within twenty years, computing power will be 1,000 times what it is 
today.94  
That trend will allow computing technology to expand its influence. 
In the same way that city planners have already developed computers 
that track aggregate traffic flows,95 governments will likely be able to 
collect and use data on how humans behave in almost all aspects of 
life. But the growth of data collection and analytics will not be uniform 
in all areas of law. The evolution will be fastest where regulated actors’ 
behavior is more frequent and more homogenous. In these situations, 
lawmakers will have more data on how individuals behave. Where 
behavior is less frequent and more heterogeneous, the predictability of 
behavior will initially be weaker.  
In the long run, however, artificially intelligent machines will not 
be bound by the limits currently facing big data. 96  Artificially 
intelligent machines are not simply programmed with a given 
structure to anticipate every possible contingency and every possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 142-147. 
91 See Moore, supra note 28; Lundstrom, supra note 28.  
92 Id. 
93 Indeed, some suggest that Moore’s Law is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy. See 
Harro van Lente & Arie Rip, Expectations in Technological Developments: an 
Example of Prospective Structures to be Filled in by Agency, in GETTING NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES TOGETHER: STUDIES IN MAKING SOCIOTECHNICAL ORDER, 206 (Cornelis 
Disco & Barend van der Meulen, eds. 1998). 
94 If this exponential trajectory continues to hold, by the end of this century, 
computing power will be over one trillion times what it is now. 
95 See, e.g., Todd Litman, Generated Traffic: Implications for Traffic Planning, 
ITE JOURNAL 38 (April 2001). See also Thomas Liebig, Nico Piatkowski, Christian 
Bockermann, & Katharina Morik, Route Planning with Real-Time Traffic 
Predictions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON MINING URBAN DATA AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXTENDING DATABASE TECHNOLOGY, 331 (2014). 
96  See, e.g., Daniela Rus, The Robots Are Coming: How Technological 
Breakthroughs Will Transform Everyday Life, 94(4) FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (2015); but 
see Martin Wolf, Same as It Ever Was, 94(4) FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15 (2015) (providing a 
skeptical view). 
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answer. Rather, artificially intelligent machines are trained to predict, 
infer, and intuit behavior and adapt to new and unique situations.97 
Artificially intelligent machines find “hidden” or “deep” connections 
in unstructured data to provide stronger predictions.98 In some sense, 
these machines are capable of “learning.”99 They update to take into 
account whether their best guesses are correct or not. In doing so, they 
amalgamate the wisdom of crowds. 100 Artificially intelligent machines 
marshal this wisdom better than traditional statistical techniques 
because the machines craft their own learning rules, rather than 
relying on a potentially biased structure imposed by humans.101  
2. Predictive technology will displace human discretion 
In the near future, more perfect algorithms will begin to displace 
lawmaker discretion. While this displacement of human discretion may 
appear novel in the legal sphere, it is simply a manifestation of the 
Moneyball phenomenon highlighted by Michael Lewis.102  
In the book Moneyball, Lewis explores the use of data in major 
league baseball to elucidate the idea that statistics and data, used 
correctly, are superior to human judgment. Scouts and coaches in 
baseball previously relied on the “look” of the player to predict whether 
a player would make it in the big leagues.103 But they were wrong. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See generally STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2009). 
98  See, e.g., Geoffrey E. Hinton, Simon Osindero, & Yee-Whye The, A Fast 
Learning Algorithm for Deep Belief Nets, 18 NEURAL COMPUTATION 1527 (2006). 
99  Machine-learning algorithms learn by recognizing features, concepts, 
principles, and ideas that humans instinctively recognize but find difficult to 
program or code. Rather than having to structure a program in order to code rules, 
the rules are crafted and understood by the artificially intelligent machine. 
100  See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE 
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, 
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS (2004).  
101 Bias may affect algorithms that are based on traditional statistical techniques 
if some errors are not observable. If the bias is not corrected, errors can be replicated 
and reinforced by using the algorithm. But recently, a branch of artificial intelligence 
called evolutionary computation has been developed to deal with such problems. 
Evolutionary algorithms, based on techniques used by evolutionary biologists, use 
elements of trial and error to search for globally optimal solutions, rather than 
simply optimizing with the existing space. Candidate solutions are tested using an 
iterative process. See David B. Fogel, Introduction to Evolutionary Computing, in 
EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 1: BASIC ALGORITHMS AND OPERATORS (Thomas Baeck, 
et al. eds. 2000). 
102 MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003). 
103 Id. at 32. 
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Their hunches were really just manifestations of years of inherited 
biases, prejudice, and outdated modes of thinking. Taking advantage of 
this, the Oakland A’s used statistical analysis to consistently 
outperform rivals who had greater financial resources.104  
The lesson here is that humans and their hunches are 
unreliable. 105  Examples can be found everywhere. Insurance 
companies have developed algorithms that predict the likelihood of 
accidents far better than humans.106  From bankers assessing loan 
applicants 107  and employers hiring prospective employees 108  to 
commercial pilots flying planes,109  humans increasingly place their 
trust in machines and discover that outcomes predicted by big data are 
systematically better than human intuition. 
The phenomenon is starting to permeate the field of law. Consider 
how judges set bail. The decision to set bail has historically been based 
on a standard. The judge weighed a number of factors, such as the 
seriousness of the alleged crime, the likelihood of guilt, whether the 
defendant had jumped bail before, the defendant’s social ties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 With limited financial resources, the A’s were able to make the playoffs year 
after year by performing detailed statistical analyses of players to build a cost 
effective, winning team that outperformed other teams with far higher payrolls. Id. 
105  See Kahneman, supra note 20.  
106  See Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons, & Cade Massey, Algorithm 
Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing Them Err, 144 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 114 (2015). 
107 Bank managers who must decide whether or not to give a customer a loan 
have seen their discretion dissolve. Banks have turned to pre-determined rules about 
who can borrow and how much they can borrow. The human bank manager is left 
with little discretion. The algorithm outperforms any individual bank manager in 
determining the viability of a customer. 
108 Employers that use statistical analyses when hiring workers make better 
hiring decisions than humans that make hiring decisions based on a one-hour 
interview. See, e.g., Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones, & David M. Kleiger, In Hiring, 
Algorithms Beat Instinct, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014); Chen-Fu Chien & Li-Fei 
Chen, Data Mining to Improve Personnel Selection and Enhance Human Capital: A 
Case Study in High-Technology Industry, 34 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPL’NS 280 (2008). 
109  Commercial airline pilots rely heavily on autopilot technology and are 
instructed not to take control of the airplane under certain circumstances. For 
example, the 2009 crash of Air France 447 into the Atlantic Ocean would have likely 
been prevented if the co-pilot did nothing and did not touch the controls when the 
plane encountered turbulence. BUREAU D’ENQUETES ET D’ANALYSES POUR LA 
SECURITE DE L’AVIATION CIVLE, FINAL REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT ON 1ST JUNE 2009 TO 
THE AIRBUS A330-203 REGISTERED F-GZCP OPERATED BY AIR FRANCE FLIGHT AF447 
RIO DE JANEIRO – PARIS (July 5, 2012), http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-
cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf. 
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employment situation, the defendant’s mental condition, and so on.110 
The list of potentially relevant factors is almost inexhaustible.111 
But now some jurisdictions are turning to predictive technology to 
reduce uncertainty and inconsistency in judges’ decisions, as well as to 
reduce the time taken to set bail.112 A complex algorithm has been 
developed that seeks to predict when particular defendants will likely 
skip bail.113 The predictive power of this algorithm, which takes into 
account data on the defendant’s characteristics, far exceeds that of any 
individual judge.  
This output from the data is more systematic and reliable than an 
individual judge’s hunch. The algorithm reduces error costs (it is better 
at assessing the likelihood of a defendant jumping bail) and decision 
costs (judges can simply apply the algorithm). Judges without the 
algorithm have less information and cannot process the information 
they do have as efficiently.  
Moreover, judges introduce bias into the system by considering 
irrelevant factors. A well-meaning judge may not even know when she 
is considering irrelevant factors. A machine does not suffer from this 
problem. Relatedly, machines can be instructed to ignore factors that 
we do not want the law to consider. Thus a machine can be told to 
ignore race, gender, religion and the like even if they are relevant to an 
outcome objective. It is much harder for a judge to affirmatively ignore 
subconscious impacts of such factors.114 
These observations run counter to the idea that there is something 
“special” and “human” about the law and legal reasoning.115 Almost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110  See, for example, the standard in Massachusetts where bail is determined by 
examining the alleged crime, the likely penalty, the likely flight risk, history of 
defaults, family in the area, employment status, and previous criminal records, 
among other criteria. G.L. c.276, § 57.  
111 Id. 
112 See Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-
of-bail-into-a-science.html. 
113  Id. Complex algorithms of this type are already in use in twenty-one 
jurisdictions across the United States, in places such as Arizona, Illinois, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania. 
114 For machine algorithms, the instruction to ignore prohibited factors is not 
perfect. Other allowed variables may perfectly correlate with and therefore 
inadvertently proxy for out-of-bounds factors. These are sometimes called “clones.” To 
the extent a lawmaker wants to exclude a factor from calculation, a programmer has 
to account for the correlation of clone variables. 
115  See Joseph Raz, Reasoning with Rules, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (2001) 
(asking what is special about legal reasoning). 
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every profession thinks their profession is special.116 In the same way 
that most drivers believe that they are above average,117  humans 
reflexively believe that their judgment and reasoning is special and 
that technology cannot replicate or replace their particular skill. In 
Moneyball, baseball scouts thought that their ability to pick a future 
major league star would outperform any statistical analysis.118 Doctors 
similarly think that doctors possess special skills.119 The same is true 
of teachers. 120  Lawyers too. 121  Perhaps more surprisingly, legal 
scholars accustomed to looking for biases share this skewed we-are-
special belief.  
Legal philosophers often contend that law is necessarily vague and 
indeterminate.122 Others argue that legal reasoning is different from 
other types of reasoning.123  Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, 
suggests that legal reasoning requires an understanding of the 
principles that underpin reasoning by analogy and has been skeptical 
that artificial intelligence will be able to replicate this 
understanding.124  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  See generally MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT, 24-53 (2005) (humans instinctively deny or 
ignore the success of such technology because of deep-seated cognitive biases, such as 
overconfidence in our own abilities and judgments). 
117 Iain A. McCormick, Frank H. Walkey, & Dianne E. Green, Comparative 
Perceptions of Driver Ability: A Confirmation and Expansion, 18 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
& PREV. 205 (1986) (about eighty percent of drivers believe that they are better than 
the median driver). 
118 See Lewis, supra note 102, at 29-42. 
119 See e.g., DONALD POLKINGHORNE, PRACTICE AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: THE 
CASE FOR A JUDGMENT-BASED PRACTICE OF CARE (2004); Samuel W. Bloom, Structure 
and Ideology in Medical Education: An Analysis of Resistance to Change, 29 J. 
HEALTH & SOC. BEH. 294 (1988). 
120  See Francoise Blin & Morag Munro, Why Hasn’t Technology Disrupted 
Academics’ Teaching Practices? Understanding Resistance to Change Through the 
Lens of Activity Theory, 50 COMPUTERS & ED. 475 (2008). 
121 See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: 
Toward A Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2011). 
122  See, e.g., TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS OF LAW, 1 (2000) (“Although not all 
laws are vague, legal systems necessarily include vague laws.”). 
123  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: 
Toward A Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(arguing that algorithmic judgment cannot replicate legal reasoning). 
124 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. CHI. 
LAW SCH. ROUNDTABLE 29 (2001) (suggesting that computer programs do not reason 
analogically the way humans do); see also Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation 
and the Premature Disruption of legal Services, __ MICH. STATE L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming) (suggesting that machines are limited in their abilities to understand 
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Professor Dan Kahan’s 2008 address to the graduating class of Yale 
Law School provides a nice example of the argument that there is 
something “special” about law.125 He contends that in order for lawyers 
to truly understand and evaluate legal reasoning they need years of 
learning from “grandmasters” 126  – such as professors and senior 
lawyers – who inculcate students with the power of legal intuition and 
judgment.127  
Professor Kahan compares the profession of lawyers to the 
profession of chick sexers who determine the gender of one-day old 
chicks. To the untrained eye, there is nothing discernably different 
about newborn male and female chickens. And yet some people with 
training from a “chick-sexing grandmaster” can exam a chick and tell 
whether it is male or female with ninety-nine percent accuracy. 
Amazingly, no one (not even the chick sexers, themselves) can say 
exactly what these experts are looking for. They simply know the 
difference when they see it. Professor Kahan claims that this “special 
power to intuitively perceive the gender of a newborn chick” is 
analogous to how lawyers determine the difference between “good and 
bad decisions.”128 Professor Kahan argues that lawyers learn how to 
reason in a special way, and that is what makes the craft of good 
lawyering so “distinctive” from other professions.129  
Within two years of Professor Kahan’s address, the world of chick 
sexing had changed dramatically. Predictive technology had been 
developed that could accurately determine the gender of a chick before 
birth.130 Just as the machines defeated the grandmasters of chess and 
Jeopardy!, this new predictive technology bested the grandmasters of 
chick sexing.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
complex law and cannot perform well and “will not play nice” where standards are 
currently the dominant form of law). 
125 Professor Dan Kahan’s Commencement Address to the Graduating Class of 
Yale Law School 2008, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ylsca .  
126  Id. See also Dan M. Kahan, et al., Ideology or Situation Sense? An 
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 
(April 6, 2015) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2590054 (testing 
whether judges have a unique situation sense expertise based on training and 
experience). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130  Hey Little Hen, THE ECONOMIST: ONLINE EXTRA (Feb. 9, 2010) 
http://www.economist.com/node/15491505. This new predictive technology relies on 
the detection of estrogen in the yolk of an egg. 
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Professor Kahan’s address was not about the effect of technology on 
law. But the fate of chick sexers illustrates a major point: there is 
nothing so special about individual human intuition – at least in 
practice – that makes it immune to displacement by technology. 
Whether pure (unbiased and unrushed) human intuition is special and 
beyond replication is an unresolved philosophical question. But in 
application, human intuition is imperfect and biased. And machine 
technology can, it turns out, do as well as humans even when the 
individuals themselves cannot adequately describe their intuitive 
process.  
The shortsighted belief that the legal profession is special and that 
lawyers and judges are immune from displacement by technological 
advances hinges on a bias that leads one to believe that only a human 
can deliver such wise judgments and decisions. Yes, lawyers require 
judgment. Yes, judges require judgment. But, the judgment of one 
human is outweighed by a decision generated by technology that takes 
into account millions of judgments and decisions.131 
 
To see where this is all going for law, consider how artificially 
intelligent machines may turn one of the most classic statements of a 
standard in U.S. legal doctrine into a micro-directive. In Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart found it very difficult to precisely pin 
down what distinguished pornography from non-pornography in 
determining the threshold test of obscenity. 132  Instead, he simply 
wrote: “I know it when I see it.”133  
Justice Stewart’s view suggests that distinguishing between 
pornography and non-pornography is something that humans can do, 
but it is difficult to write an ex ante rule that clearly defines the line. 
Justice Stewart preferred to leave the determination as a standard, to 
be resolved later. 
Artificially intelligent technology can already recognize and analyze 
images.134 It is not just a judge who can “see it.” In the near future, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Surowiecki, supra note 100. One might also note that judgment is about 
making the right decision in the absence of full information about outcomes. Once the 
outcomes are known, that sort of judgment is in a sense unnecessary. 
132 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
133  Id. at 197 (Stewart J, concurring). 
134  Four Microsoft researchers have developed a visual recognition program that 
has an error rate of 4.94%, less than that of a human, 5.1%. See Kaiming He, 
Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, & Jian Sun, Delving Deep into Rectifiers: Surpassing 
Human-Level Performance on ImageNet Classification, MICROSOFT RESEARCH PAPER 
(Feb. 2015), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1502.01852.pdf. According to one report, Japanese 
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artificially intelligent machines will be able to develop highly complex 
rules that generate immediate and simple predictions of the legality of 
particular materials (“this image is/is not pornographic”). Just imagine 
that Justice Stewart identified fifty pornographic images for the 
computer. At that point, the artificial intelligence programs can find 
deep connections to identify the pattern that is driving the distinction, 
but that Justice Stewart could not articulate. Indeed, such pattern 
recognition is one of the areas where this technology is already way 
ahead of humans. And it is why the technology is thought to be so 
valuable as a diagnostic tool.  
If such technology were implemented, the law on the books might 
still look like a standard; but an individual could refer to the machine 
output to get advance micro-directives and behave as though she were 
governed by a rule. 
B. The feasibility of communication technology 
Can lawmakers adequately give timely notice of the law to 
regulated actors? Can they provide these individuals with instant 
notice of how best to comply with the law? In the same way that traffic 
lights let a driver know that she should stop, communication 
technology can give rise to a world where all laws are reduced to stop-
go directives that are instantly communicated to regulated actors. In 
this subsection, we discuss the types of technology and infrastructure 
that will facilitate this.  
The costs of communication have been almost obliterated by the 
Internet. The so-called “Internet of Things”135 is an interconnected 
network of physical objects and devices that are embedded with 
electronics and sensors to allow products to be controlled and used 
remotely by the user or manufacturer. Recent estimates suggest that 
between 50 billion to 100 billion objects and devices will be embedded 
with such technology by the year 2020.136  Mobile applications are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cameras are even being used to identify whether subway passengers are intoxicated. 
Amber Bouman, Clever Cameras Detect Drunken Railway Passengers in Japan, 
ENGADGET (Aug. 13, 2014) http://www.engadget.com/2015/08/13/clever-cameras-
detect-drunken-railway-passengers-in-japan/. 
135 See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (Jun. 22, 2009), 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986. 
136 Philip N. Howard, How Big Is the Internet of Things and How Big Will It Get?, 
THE BROOKINGS INST. (June 8, 2015), 
"http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2015/06/8-future-of-iot-part-1" 
(estimating 50 billion embedded objects); Maria Farrell, The Internet of Things – Who 
Wins, Who Loses, THE GUARDIAN (August 14, 2015), 
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becoming the first port of call for gathering and processing 
information.137  
The Internet of Things and mobile applications are not, however, 
simply ways to improve the consumer experience. Lawmakers can use 
this technology. The Internet will facilitate immediate communication 
between lawmakers, regulators, individuals, and corporations. Take, 
for example, the field of environmental regulation. Regulators could 
more easily monitor emissions of factories through the Internet of 
Things. Regulators could instantly determine when factories are 
exceeding their limits and quickly inform firms operating those 
factories of the violation.  
The example of advance tax rulings above suggests that the IRS 
will be able to provide immediate compliance information to 
individuals and corporations using similar technology to the Internet 
of Things. Regulated actors could enter information into a web-based 
or mobile application and receive a ruling on a device (like a phone) or 
some wearable technology (like a watch) from the regulator in a timely 
manner.  
Such infrastructure already exists. For example, cardiologists today 
can simply refer to an app, enter in relevant information, and be given 
the optimal response for a patient.138 As technology improves on the 
fact-gathering front, individuals may not even be required to enter 
much data into the programs; rather, devices will simply recognize the 
contours of the factual situation and give notice of whether the 
individual is complying with the law.  
Indeed, lawmakers could even provide notice of micro-directives 
when the need for it is immediate. Individuals could wear items, such 
as contact lenses, that instantly analyze a situation and give an 
immediate directive as to the legality of a potential action. The 
military is already experimenting with this type of technology for 
identifying combat targets. 139  But more mundane uses are also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/14/internet-of-things-winners-and-
losers-privacy-autonomy-capitalism (estimating 100 billion embedded objects). 
137 For example, there are over 1.5 million different applications at the Apple App 
store and nearly 1.6 million Google play applications. See, e.g., Number of Apps 
Available in Leading Stores as of July 2015, STATISTICA: STATISTICS PORTAL (August 
1, 2015), http://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-
leading-app-stores/.  
138 See supra, McMillan & Dwoskin, supra note 40 (noting the availability of such 
an app launched by the American College of Cardiology in June 2015).  
139 In an attempt to avoid (or, at least, minimize) friendly fire and fratricide, 
military scientists have developed combat identification (or “IFF,” Identification 
Friend or Foe) technology that can more easily and more quickly identify whether 
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probable: Can you turn left at an intersection? Can you cross the 
street? Can you attempt to board that subway car? And so on. 
The Internet of Things drastically reduces the cost of a lawmaker 
communicating with regulated actors. But the Internet of Things does 
not just facilitate communication. There is a feedback effect. The 
devices that form part of the Internet of Things also collect data on how 
individuals and corporations behave. Lawmakers can generate even 
better predictions of human behavior by harnessing such data.140 In 
doing so, the Internet of Things will further reinforce the feasibility of 
the predictive technology.  
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 In this Part, we explore some implications and consequences of our 
predictions. If micro-directives become the dominant form of all law, 
these implications will be profound. But even a short-run trend in 
isolated fields of law will have major impacts on the way we think 
about law. We will focus on the long-run version of our prediction to 
demonstrate the scope of possible changes.  
We suggest that the micro-directives will emerge as a new form of 
law that reduces the uncertainty costs of standards and the decision 
and error costs of rules. There are, however, other costs that may arise 
from a world of micro-directives. While the law will generate less 
uncertainty and fewer errors, it may be deficient in other ways. Here, 
we identify four areas where the consequences and potential costs of 
the emergence of micro-directives may be substantial. First, it will 
change the broad institutional balance of power in our political and 
legal system. Second, it may change the development and substantive 
content of legislative policy. Third, it will transform the practice and 
training of law. Fourth, it will have moral and ethical consequences for 
individual citizens, altering their day-to-day decision-making process 
and changing their relationship with lawmakers and government. In 
the remainder of this Part, we explore these implications and 
consequences in general terms. We conclude by noting how the 
existence of these costs may or may not affect our prediction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
combatants are friendly or enemies. For example, Lockheed Martin recently 
announced certification to produce an IFF system for aircrews for the United States 
Depart of Defense. MEADS System Gains Full Certification for Identifying Friend or 
Foe Aircraft, (May 21, 2014) http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-
releases/2014/may/mfc-052114-mead-system-gains-full-certification-identifying-
friendfoe-aircraft.html. 
140 Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (discussing fact-gathering technology 
for personalized default rules). 
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A. The death of judging? Institutional changes to the legal system 
The death of rules and standards will produce a shift in the balance 
of our political institutions. The proliferation of clear micro-directives 
largely obviates the need for ex post adjudication. This reduced role 
diminishes the ability of judges to influence the law and increases the 
power of ex ante lawmakers.141 The change in the structure of the law 
does leave some room for some ex post adjudication of evidentiary 
questions, but even that will be reduced as the technology for 
observing facts ex ante improves. 
This is potentially concerning because, when judges decide cases, 
they do more than simply apply rules or standards. They also have the 
ability to shift and modify the law. This can happen in at least three 
different ways. First, judges can interpret a law (rule or standard) 
differently than the ex ante lawmakers intended – assuming those 
lawmakers even had an identifiable intent.142 Judges can also choose 
to ignore rules and standards altogether in the guise of 
interpretation.143 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 2, at 261 (“The legislature’s choice whether 
to enact a standard or a set of precise rules is implicitly also a choice between 
legislative and judicial rulemaking.”). See also Schauer, supra note 15, at 310 
(“According to the conventional wisdom, therefore, the choice between rules and 
standards . . . is an important and powerful implement of institutional design 
determining much of who decides what in a complex and multi-institutional 
society.”). In this sense, the death of rules and standards precedes the death of the 
judicial function. 
142 On the ability of judges to add their own interpretation, see – among many 
others – Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 809 (1982); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 
(1981); Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 
(1984); Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561 (1989); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 
(1980); but see William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). The idea that legislative intent 
exists is not obvious. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: 
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)  
143 See, e.g., William Hubbard & M. Todd Henderson, Do Judges Follow the Law? 
An Empirical Test of Congressional Control Over Judicial Behavior, (unpublished 
manuscript) (2014); Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A 
Study of Dissent, 42 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 60 (2015) (different judges writing 
different opinions in the same case cite different precedents and lean toward 
precedents that align with each judges’ political preference); Anthony Niblett & 
Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016) 
(Court of Appeals judges lean towards citing precedents that align with the political 
composition of the panel); but see Anthony Niblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents 
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Second, judges can influence popular and institutional views about 
policy objectives. Judges can impact popular opinion by highlighting a 
particular issue in a case, using their position to make policy 
statements, or by issuing incremental holdings that generate support 
for movements that have broader consequences.144 Additionally, given 
the U.S. federal system, decisions of courts in one jurisdiction might 
have larger social consequences that impact non-judicial change to 
policy objectives in other jurisdictions.145 Many think that this role of 
the courts in challenging stale and entrenched views has a salutary 
effect on our democracy.146 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to Justify Extra-Legal Decisions? A Statistical Examination, 70 MD. L. REV. 234 
(2010). 
144  The legitimation hypothesis suggests that public opinion will begin to 
converge toward the opinion of the court after a court has handed down a decision. 
See, e.g., Valerie Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An 
Experimental Study of the Court’s Ability to Change Opinion, 23 AM. POL. Q. 109 
(1995); Brandon L. Bartels & Diana C. Mutz, Explaining Processes of Institutional 
Opinion Leadership, 71 J. POL. 249 (2009). There is prominent literature discussing 
“backlash” to court decisions that have the opposite effect of the legitimation 
hypothesis. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Others suggest that the effect is more 
constrained. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). Further, court decisions can polarize opinion. See Charles H. 
Franklin, & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, 
Public Opinion and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.751 (1989); Timothy R. Johnson & 
Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299 (1998). 
145 For example, in 2003, the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court held that 
same sex marriage was legal. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003). Scholars have debated the effect that this decision had on public 
opinion and whether the subsequent change in public opinion set the law on a new 
path, culminating in the Supreme Court of the United States finding a constitutional 
right to same sex marriage in 2015. See PATRICK EGAN, NATHANIEL PERSILY, & KEVIN 
WALLSTEN, “GAY RIGHTS” PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 
(2008); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality 
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153 (2009); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond 
Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 151 (2009); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: 
COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2015). 
146 See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the 
Supreme Court As a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS (1962). 
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Finally, judges can outright declare policy objectives to be improper 
or unconstitutional. 147  This judicial review of legislative policy is 
considered by many to be an integral part of our system of checks and 
balances.148 
These lawmaking roles of judges will change along with the 
fundamental nature of law. Judges will lose much of their oversight 
and lawmaking power. For non-constitutional questions, the 
interpretive role may disappear entirely.149 They will no longer have 
the power to reinterpret or ignore laws. The policy objectives of law 
will be set by the ex ante rulemakers (legislative or regulatory). And 
the judiciary – at least if it maintains its current form and structure – 
will have little or no occasion to question or change those policy 
objectives. The opportunities for statutory interpretation and filling in 
the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply 
instructed to obey simple directives.  
The concern here is a separate question than whether machine-
aided algorithms can implement policy objectives. The question is 
whether there is an independent branch of government with the power 
to question the policy decisions of the ex ante lawmakers. When the 
lawmakers decide on legislative objectives and parameters for the 
machine algorithms, do we want a separate branch of government to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803). See also Jack Rakove, The Origins of 
Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997); Saikrishna 
Prakash & John Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003). 
148  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and 
Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Larry Alexander & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005); 
David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
859 (2009). There are, of course, strong critics of judicial review. See, e.g., William W. 
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J. 1 (1969); 
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court Term 2000-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
149  Deciding non-constitutional questions is the bulk of what judges do. 
Constitutional questions, while high profile, reflect a small fraction of the judicial 
caseload. Even in the Supreme Court of the United States, the percentage of cases 
has not exceeded fifty percent in recent years. See, RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK (2008). The number is far lower in state courts. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, 
Constitutional Litigation in the United States, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
COMPARISON: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT, 28 (Ralf Rogowski & Thomas Gawron, eds. 2002) (over the period 1940-1970, 
only 14.6 percent of state court cases had constitutional issues); EDWARD V. SCHNEIER 
& BRIAN MURTAUGH, NEW YORK POLITICS: A TALE OF TWO STATES (2015) (less than 
twenty percent of cases involve Constitutional questions). 
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review those decisions? If we do, the reduced role of the judiciary is 
troubling. 
Moreover, the number of cases litigated will plummet. The question 
in most cases will simply be whether or not the citizen complied with 
the simple directive. The case will have two questions: Was the light 
red? And did the citizen stop? The evidence to answer those questions 
will continue to be more readily accessible. As the number of cases and 
controversies litigated falls and the interpretation of policy becomes 
unnecessary, a judge’s opportunities to use a case to make policy 
statements and impact opinion will diminish. On the other hand, the 
judge’s opportunities to inject bias and error will also diminish.150 
Things are a little more complicated for questions of constitutional 
law. In theory at least, constitutional standards151 are no different 
from the standards we have discussed throughout this Article. A 
machine could easily be programmed to tell us whether a particular 
search was unreasonable,152 whether certain speech was pornography, 
whether micro-directives are valid under the commerce clause or some 
other provision, and so on. 
There are institutional structures, however, that may appear to be 
barriers to the promulgation of micro-directives for constitutional 
review. As our regime currently stands, neither Congress nor any 
agency can dictate that a machine algorithm will decide the 
constitutionality of laws. If Congress creates an algorithm that takes 
into account race or results in the prohibition of speech, the courts and 
not a machine would declare those algorithms unconstitutional.  
As long as Marbury v. Madison 153  remains good law, the 
constitutional decision on an algorithm would have to come from the 
judiciary. But the courts could, of course, bless the use of particular 
types of algorithms going forward, deeming these to be constitutionally 
proper. For example an exigent search that was conducted pursuant a 
machine directive could be presumed to be reasonable if the machine 
used a judicially blessed algorithm. This precedential guidance to 
regulatory agencies154 could essentially provide the policy objectives 
that must guide the micro-directive technology for constitutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See Part II above on judicial bias. 
151 The United States Constitution generally operates through standards. See 
Schauer, supra note 15, at 308. 
152 Cf. Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and 
the Fourth Amendment, __ U. PENN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming). 
153 5 U.S. 138 (1803). 
154 We discuss this type of second-order regulation above. See supra Part I.C.1.  
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review. This delegation would facilitate the promulgation of micro-
directives in the constitutional law space. 
Some, of course, may argue that reducing judicial power over policy 
is a good thing. As the democratically elected branches become more 
powerful, for example, fears about overreaching by unelected judges 
will be dampened.155 Others will disagree.156 For those who advocate 
the active role of judges, alternative mechanisms for that role might be 
pursued. Perhaps a judiciary that provides advisory opinions on 
legislative and regulatory policy decisions could preserve the 
judiciary’s oversight and influence on society.157   
B. The development and substance of policy objectives 
In addition to policy decisions moving away from judges, the 
process by which legislatures and regulators make those decisions will 
change.  
Broader objectives. As we noted above in Part I.D., regulatory 
agents will be the primary force behind the shift to micro-directives. 
Legislatures may continue to enact standards, but they will leave the 
machine-aided implementation to regulators. Those standards may be 
nothing more than a statement of the policy objective that should guide 
the rulemaking machines. Regulators will then translate that broad 
objective into specific sets of rules generated by machines.  
Additionally, the ability to achieve broad goals through machine-
derived micro-directives will potentially allow legislatures to state 
their objectives at increasingly higher levels of abstract social policy. 
Rather than concern themselves with details of implementation, the 
legislature will be able to concentrate on the bigger picture. For 
example, instead of worrying about specific speed limits, the 
legislature will focus on the purpose of traffic law: does society want 
laws that reduce accidents, minimize travel time, reduce fuel 
consumption, or some perfect mix?  
At its extreme, learning algorithms aided by big data could be 
asked to prescribe a vast set of micro-directives covering multiple fields 
to achieve an even broader social goal, such as maximizing welfare, 
minimizing accidental death, minimizing wealth inequality, or (more 
likely) some combination that sets certain acceptable thresholds for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); sources cited supra note 148. 
156 See sources cited supra note 148. 
157 On the other hand, it is possible that the influence on society requires actual 
cases and controversies to make judicial rulings more salient.  
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these and other social values. This becomes possible because 
lawmakers no longer have to figure out and set out each precise rule 
and its connection to other rules. Instead, machines will work out the 
millions of connected micro-directives that achieve a stated slate of 
policy objectives. This complex catalog of micro-directives can be 
targeted to small instances of behavior that fit within a larger web of 
behavioral actions to achieve a broad goal. 
Faster change. Algorithm-driven laws will automatically and 
rapidly adapt to the circumstances, optimizing according to the 
objective of the law. But changes to the law result in winners and 
losers.158 Frequent changes to the law may impose additional risks on 
individuals and may affect the willingness of individuals to invest in 
projects that may be subject to legal uncertainty.159 A smart machine 
will, however, be able to take into account any effects on the values of 
reliance investments to find a global optimum, rather than merely a 
local optimum.  
Moreover, predictive technology can be used to advise lawmakers 
on other potential unintended consequences of certain policy objectives. 
Under today’s system, laws frequently have unintended consequences. 
Laws that change behavior in unexpected ways that undermine the 
law’s goal or disrupt some unrelated area of human behavior in 
unexpected ways are common.160 
With the current state of technology, it often takes years before the 
consequences of a policy decision are fully understood. But as big data 
and predictive technology improve, lawmakers will be able to more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509 (1986); Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated With Government 
Action, 94 SCAND. J. ECON. 525 (1989); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH 
LOSERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITIONS (2014). 
159 The fact that such uncertainty leads to a reduced ex ante investment is a 
manifestation of the hold-up problem. See generally Paul A. Grout, Investment and 
Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 
ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984); Jean Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 235 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999). 
160 See generally Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive 
Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894. An example of a recent legislative change with 
unintended consequences occurred when the Ontario government increased access to 
the small claims court, which had a regressive effect, with richer plaintiffs displacing 
poor plaintiffs. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, The Regressive Effects of 
Increased Access to Justice (unpublished manuscript) (2015). 
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accurately identify these consequences at the time when they make the 
rules.161  
Unintended consequences. The potential for unintended 
consequences highlights an important facet of the death of rules and 
standards. Those who set the broad policies in this new world will need 
to have deep understandings of both social objectives and the way that 
these technologies work. Machine-generated micro-directives can only 
reduce unintended consequences if the machines are programmed to 
identify the types of consequences about which policymakers or society 
care. The humans who instruct machines to create micro-directives 
must communicate policy objectives to the machines in ways that do 
not distort the message, and they must “ask” the machines to provide 
assessments of the consequences of proposed objectives.  
If lawmakers do not have a deep understanding of policy 
consequences and programming, the machines may distort rather than 
further law.162  Such concerns animate many science-fiction movies 
about the fears of artificial intelligence.163 The current debate about 
Google driverless cars highlights these concerns. Many have 
questioned how one should program a self-driving car to deal with 
ethical decisions about the value of life.164 Can Google cars, they ask, 
deal with ethical questions that face human drivers? One commentator 
notes that humans believe that avoiding a collision with a dog is more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The technology may, however, get ahead of itself. While predictive technology 
reduces the chance of unintended consequences for any given law, it also increases 
the rate at which laws can be promulgated. If the rate of promulgation increases fast 
enough, unintended consequences may increase even as laws become more accurate. 
We must know more about how eager lawmakers will be to promulgate micro-
directives to understand how significant this risk is. 
162 In the literature on artificial intelligence, this is referred to as “perverse 
instantiation.” See, e.g., Nick Bostrom, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 
(2014). 
163 Such dystopian visions of the future are found in many popular books and 
movies. Some examples include: ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950); 2001: A SPACE 
ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1968), TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco 
Pictures, 1991); ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures, 1987). See generally Illah Reza 
Nourbakhsh, The Coming Robot Dystopia: All Too Inhuman, 94(4) FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
23 (2015). 
164 See, e.g., Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-
autonomous-cars/280360/; Chris Bryant, Driverless Cars Must Learn to Take Ethical 
Route, THE FIN. TIMES (March 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ab2cc1e-b752-"http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ab2cc1e-­‐b752-­‐11e4-­‐981d-­‐00144feab7de.html"	   \l	   "slide0"	   http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ab2cc1e-b752-
11e4-981d-00144feab7de.html#slide0.  
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important than avoiding a collision with animals that are not pets (like 
squirrels).165 But machines – if programmed correctly – could replicate 
that value judgment and, given the advances in predictive technology, 
would execute the judgment with greater accuracy than a human. On 
the other hand, if the commentator is wrong – and squirrels are to be 
avoided with the same care as dogs, then the program can be changed 
accordingly.166 The key, then, is in the lawmaker’s ability to program 
that value into the machines.  
Still, some appear to worry that poorly programmed cars will 
implement a frightening system of social values where they swerve to 
kill the “wrong” people.167 Implicit in this critique, however, is the false 
idea that human drivers always swerve to kill the “right” people. It 
would seem that the trick in getting all of this right is not in 
programming the computer, but in somehow agreeing on which people 
are the “right” ones to kill. That is an age-old moral problem to which 
we still do not have an agreed-upon answer. Thus, the so-called “trolley 
problem”168 is, indeed, a real one for self-driving cars. But that is a 
familiar critique on the limits of human ethics, not on the limits of self-
driving cars. In other words, it is still a problem for human driven cars 
too. 
In any event, lawmakers of the future must be able to translate 
society’s values into programmable objectives for the machines. The 
task of identifying those values, it seems to us, will remain a human 
one.169 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 A Point of View: The Ethics of the Driverless Car, BBC MAGAZINE (Jan. 24, 
2014), available at: www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25861214. 
166 Janet D. Stemwedel, Building Self-Driving Cars that Drive Ethically, FORBES 
MAGAZINE, (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/05/building-self-driving-cars-
that-drive-ethically/ (noting that Google is consulting with moral philosophers).  
167 See Tanay Jaipuria, Self-Driving Cars and the Trolley Problem, HUFFINGTON 
POST TECH THE BLOG (June 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tanay-
jaipuria/self-driving-cars-and-the-trolley-problem_b_7472560.html (asking whether 
cars can make ethical decisions that must value different lives and whether they 
should favor the life of their owner); Tim Worstall, When Should Your Driverless Car 
from Google Be Allowed To Kill You, FORBES MAGAZINE (June 18, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/06/18/when-should-your-driverless-car-
from-google-be-allowed-to-kill-you/ (same). 
168  On the trolley problem, see generally, PHILIPPA FOOT, THE PROBLEM OF 
ABORTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE DOUBLE EFFECT IN VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L. J. 1395 (1985). 
169 There is a possibility that machines could simply observe human behavior and 
from that deduce what objectives the majority of persons would do and follow that 
behavior. That would eliminate even the need for human policy considerations. We 
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C. Changes to the practice of law 
The observations thus far lead naturally to the next related 
observation: the death of rules and standards will fundamentally 
transform the practice of law. For years, a chorus of scholars have been 
pointing out that technology will disrupt and transform the practice of 
law.170 We join this chorus to note that as lawmakers adopt laws that 
are translated and communicated to citizens as simple micro-
directives, the role of lawyers will change dramatically. The role of 
compliance and litigation lawyers will diminish, while the role of a 
lawyer as lobbyist or policy advisor will grow.  
The compliance lawyer today serves as an intermediary who 
advises a client on how best to comply with complex rules or vague 
standards. Part of the expertise of a compliance lawyer is in predicting 
how an ex post adjudicator will likely apply the relevant standard to a 
certain set of facts.  
Thus, in our tax example, a client might ask a lawyer whether or 
not her business arrangement complies with the standards of the tax 
code. In our medical example, a doctor might ask a lawyer whether her 
diagnostic procedures would be deemed reasonable under the 
controlling legal standard. The lawyer reads the relevant law and 
exercises her judgment – based on education, experience, and other 
expertise – to provide a prediction. The lawyer may go beyond a yes or 
no answer and suggest creative ways that a client could alter behavior 
to increase the likelihood that the adjudicator would find the client in 
compliance.  
Technology will reduce the need for such compliance lawyers. The 
citizen will simply be told directly whether behavior complies with the 
law or not. There is no need to consult a lawyer to ask whether a traffic 
light is green or red. Similarly, litigators will no longer be in the 
business of arguing about the application of standards, and judges will 
no longer be in the business of applying them.  
There will be skeptics. As discussed above in Part II, even though 
technology has already displaced many labor markets, there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reject that possibility – not because the computers cannot do it, but because few 
would agree that entrenching observed majoritarian behavior is the appropriate 
objective of law.  
170 See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, (2013); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AND 
INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013); Ribstein, supra note 11; and Henderson, 
supra note 11. 
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common sentiment that many hold that their profession is different 
and somehow immune to technological disruptions. 171  But simply 
noting that a compliance lawyer’s role as information middleman will 
disappear is not to say that the entire profession of law will be 
automated. Rather, there will be a shift in the types of tasks that 
lawyers are charged with. Lawyers will be forced to adapt to the new 
environment.  
Setting the policy directives of a machine algorithm is complicated. 
To tell a machine that its objective is to minimize traffic accidents, 
without more, would lead to standstill traffic – or, more absurdly, the 
prohibition of motor vehicles. Instructing the machine to minimize 
travel times could lead to an abundance of car accidents. A machine 
can only write rules to meet the objective as it is presented. As we have 
discussed, the humans who set the objective must be able to 
understand the consequences of different objectives and must be able 
to understand which objectives are desirable. 
Understanding the implications of different objectives requires not 
only an understanding of the technology, but also a highly 
interdisciplinary understanding of human behavior and the goals of 
our regulatory state. The trend of the last fifty years toward 
interdisciplinary legal education, 172  with an emphasis on 
understanding topics such as economics, psychology, philosophy, 
history, and so on, is one that will serve this new role of lawyers well. 
We note in passing that recent countertrends toward so-called 
practical lawyering173 are likely to be wasteful. The idea of training 
lawyers solely in practical skills provides little benefit when the skills 
required are likely to change rapidly. The understanding of legal policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 See supra Part II.A.2. 
172 See generally ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE 
DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV 34, 34-5 (1993) 
(documenting the rise of “law and” movements being taught at law schools); Alex M. 
Johnson Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between 
Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991); Anthony D’Amato, The 
Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education, NULS PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
06-32 (2006). 
173 See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, & JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, THE 
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 12 (2007); R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond 
Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 53 BOSTON C. L. 
REV. 1515 (2012); Joe Palazollo, Law School Program Emphasizes Practical Skills, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/law-school-program-
emphasizes-practical-skills-1420419113. 
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should remain the focus of the legal endeavor because human 
individuals will set the high-level policy objectives for the law.174  
D. The broader consequences of these technologies on individuals 
The death of rules and standards will raise major concerns about 
privacy, autonomy, and the ethics of human decision-making.  
1. Privacy 
Most obviously, as with all applications of big data, the use of data 
gathering to predict outcomes raises privacy concerns. 175  These 
concerns have been addressed extensively in other contexts.176 In our 
context, the potential for invasions of privacy is high. Government 
controlled machines will be gathering data about individual behavior 
and using that information in two ways. First, it will use the 
information to assess an individual’s behavior and provide a legal 
directive. Second, it will use the information as part of its aggregated 
data that goes into setting the micro-directives. Stop light cameras and 
GPS tracking already create the ability for the government to know a 
citizen’s comings and goings. These capabilities to invade privacy will 
increase. And the concerns become greater when the government uses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 To be clear, this is not a technological limitation. Policy will be set by humans 
rather than machines because that is the one area will humans will resist 
technological advances most strongly. There are, of course, many who think all 
aspects of life will inevitably be controlled by artificial intelligence. See, e.g., Ray 
Kurzweil, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY (2005). 
Others are skeptical. In any case, the power over ultimate policy objectives will be 
one of the last things that humans cede to machines. 
175 See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 136 (investigating the effect of the Internet of 
Things on privacy and autonomy, suggesting that they will become the preserve of 
the powerful). 
176 The literature on this new topic is already vast. See BIG DATA, PRIVACY, AND 
THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane, et al. eds. 2014); Lisa 
M. Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 LAW & PHIL. 119 (2003); Porat 
& Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1467-68; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in 
the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012); 
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age 
of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623 (2013); Paul Ohm, The 
Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339 (2013); Paul 
Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701 (2010); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2015); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, 
and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the 
Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008). 
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the information it gathers in conjunction with technology to predict 
future actions by an individual.177 
There is a trade-off here. The more limitations placed on the 
government’s ability to gather information, the weaker will be its 
ability to create precise micro-directives.178 Moreover, there may be 
privacy-based calls for the halting of micro-directives because the mere 
prediction based on aggregate data violates principles of privacy.  
The debate and policy choices on privacy here are likely to track 
general debates and choices about privacy and big data. One can also 
expect that as individuals continue to waive privacy in private-law 
contexts,179  public law will be given additional freedom to gather 
information that facilitates the evolution of micro-directives. 
2. Autonomy 
As lawmakers promulgate more precise micro-directives to advance 
broad policy objectives, the scope of law can expand. Take, for example, 
a broad policy objective that seeks to increase productivity. In the 
hands of a powerful algorithm, micro-directives aimed at a broad goal 
like that could dictate virtually every decision in a citizen’s life. Smart 
traffic lights could decide who goes first based on productivity levels. 
Smart restaurants could dictate what a citizen is allowed to eat for 
breakfast.180 This presents real concerns for individual autonomy.181  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 The United States government has started to investigate the benefits and 
costs of using big data. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES, May 2014.  
178 Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1467-68 (noting the tradeoff 
between privacy protections and “granular personalized default rules”). As predictive 
technology gets better, less and less personal data will be necessary to create precise 
micro-rules. But some information gathering will always be necessary. 
179 See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1468 (noting that “most consumers 
bring strongly pragmatic perspectives to privacy tradeoffs, and they are increasingly 
willing to share information about themselves when the benefits from sharing are 
increased and the threats from sharing are diminished”). 
180 There is no doubt that such outcomes would be controversial, as the debate 
over the “broccoli” analogy in the Affordable Care Act litigation demonstrated. See 
James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on the Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-a-
symbol-in-the-health-care-debate.html?_r=0. Another example can be found in New 
York City’s “big-soda ban.” See Michael M. Grynbaum, New York’s Ban on Big Sodas 
is Rejected by Final Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/nyregion/city-loses-final-appeal-on-limiting-
sales-of-large-sodas.html. 
181 The concept of autonomy in law and philosophy is deeply controversial. See, 
e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013). 
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But these concerns are not directly objections to the use of 
predictive technology. Rather they are objections to reckless 
lawmaking or to overreaching. Lawmakers have to understand what 
objectives to use in setting micro-directives. Improving productivity 
might be one policy objective, but there may be other constraining 
objectives that should be factored in, such as respecting certain 
spheres of individual decision-making. If principles of human 
autonomy require the law to allow humans to make certain decisions 
even when those decisions are inconsistent with other social values, 
then the lawmakers must be aware of those principles and avoid 
encroaching on them when they set policy objectives. This reinforces 
the importance of lawyers and lawmakers as interdisciplinary policy 
experts. 
The well-trained expert lawmaker might still overreach. The 
technologies we have described provide the tools for almost limitless 
lawmaking. A goal to increase productivity at all costs is difficult to 
enact through legislation today – the information costs are too high. 
But that will not be the case with micro-directives. As the information 
limits on lawmaking fall, it will only be political costs that restrain 
those in power. As in our discussion of the diminished role of judges, 
this once again counsels in favor of attention to institutional 
structures. 
A final and perhaps even deeper concern is that lawmakers may 
turn the micro-directives into actual physical restraints on action. 
Rather than tell you that the light is red, the technology of the future 
may simply prevent your car from moving. A self-driving car with no 
driver override could be entirely in the control of the lawmaker.182 As 
the Internet of Things continues to expand, this could be true of most 
daily actions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Professor David Strauss has noted that “autonomy is a notoriously vague notion; 
there is a danger that any attempt to justify a principle in terms of autonomy will 
slip into question-begging assertions about the nature of truly free and rational 
human beings.” David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991). Still, there is no question that individual 
autonomy is implicated by the power of the state to create limitless micro-directives 
to achieve virtually any legislative objective.  
182 Additional concerns would arise if individuals do not know who owns the 
controlling technology. See Dan Gillmor, In the Future, the Robots May Control You, 
and Silicon Valley Will Control Them, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/internet-of-things-software-
privacy-silicon-valley (noting that autonomy, security, and privacy seem to be an 
after-thought of the move towards the Internet of Things). 
	   	   	  
	   53	  
From a technological perspective, the move from micro-directives to 
automatic restraint is small; but, from an ethical and policy 
perspective, it is enormous. The benefits of such a move include 
increased compliance and increased certainty; but the costs arrive by 
way of a large loss of individual autonomy. One might think such a 
rule were appropriate if the restraint kept a gun from firing in a 
situation that would be murder. But things would be different if the 
rule related to something less malicious like parking in an illegal spot 
outside a hospital in an emergency or something mundane like 
crossing a neighborhood street. Our prediction about the death of rules 
and standards does not necessarily imply prior restraint, which is a 
topic that needs to be addressed separately.183  
3. Ethics 
There may be additional concerns that the death of rules and 
standards will erode moral decision-making. Some argue that 
individuals who solely follow rules and directives will become robotic – 
mere automatons who fail to appreciate the moral choices that should 
underlie their actions.184 This is a point made by Professor Shiffrin.185 
Forcing individuals to engage in moral deliberation may be important 
to the moral health of individuals or of a democratic society. If this is 
true, the death of rules and standards will bring with it significant 
costs. We are skeptical that anyone could stop this evolution, so the 
appropriate response is likely to seek out alternative outlets for human 
moral deliberation and take that into account in the process of 
determining the appropriate boundaries of the law. 
Finally, people are generally uncomfortable with allowing machines 
to make important ethical decisions. As discussed above, the debate 
about Google driverless cars demonstrates this.186 In that context, 
many have already begun to ask whether it is acceptable for a machine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J. LAW & 
PUB. POL’Y 795 (2012).  
184 See, e.g., Evan Selinger & Brett Frischmann, Will the Internet of Things Result 
in Predictable People?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-
people (noting that people will essentially become programmable, like machines). 
185 See Shiffrin, supra note 10. Compare LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, 
THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001) 
(investigating the dilemma created between individual moral judgment and rules 
that restate moral principles in concrete terms). 
186 See supra Part III.B. 
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to make complex ethical decisions about life or death.187 If we bracket 
Professor Shiffrin’s concerns about moral atrophy, the source of 
concern appears to arise from a sense that humans have a unique 
ability to make ethical decisions.188 It should be noted, however, that 
even when a machine is making an algorithmic calculation these are 
human decisions. Humans decide which values the machine considers. 
Humans tell it what its objective is.  
But that does not necessarily alleviate the concern. There is 
perhaps an ethical value in having a human making important instant 
decisions rather than placing ourselves on a course of action that 
cannot be reviewed in the actual moment. We suspect that a large part 
of what is going on here is lingering skepticism about accuracy 
concerns, which we addressed in Part II. People often trust human 
hunches more than complex machine decisions even in the face of 
evidence that the machines are more accurate. Perhaps it is a fear of 
the unknown. But as we have noted above, there is little evidence that 
humans will be systematically better at making these decisions than 
machines. 
Still a deeper philosophical problem remains. Something that 
makes us human might be lost when lawmakers use machines to make 
all of our collective value judgments in advance (even if those 
judgments are accurate).189 This may be at the root of the fear with 
which people view artificial intelligence.  
These are pressing ethical problems that will face lawmakers in the 
future. The current trend is toward micro-directives that reduce in-the-
moment ethical decisions. To understand whether that is a good thing, 
lawmakers must engage with philosophers and ethicists on these 
questions as the evolution to machine-derived micro-directives 
progresses.  
 
* * * 
 
Before concluding, it is worth noting an implicit assumption in our 
prediction: the implications and consequences we discuss here will not 
themselves prevent the death of rules and standards. One might think 
that if the institutional upheaval and autonomy concerns are great 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See supra Part III.B. 
188 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 164 (noting that humans are presumed to be able to 
make ethical judgments, whereas computers have an untested track record). 
189 See generally MACHINE ETHICS (Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson, 
eds. 2011). 
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enough, lawmakers will reject the move to micro-directives. We do not 
see this happening. The growth of predictive technology is robust. The 
lure of accuracy (“getting things right”) and the regulated actors’ desire 
for certainty are powerful forces that will dominate political and legal 
debates. The more nuanced considerations we discuss in this Part will, 
we think, be sidelined. 
In that sense, our prediction is about the law’s current course. 
Those who believe the costs of that course are unacceptable should 
focus on methods of alleviating these costs or finding means to 
intervene and change that evolutionary path. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As machines become increasingly intelligent, and continue to 
outperform human judgment, the influence of artificial intelligence will 
spread far and wide. The technologies we have discussed are already 
being used by doctors to detect cancers, by consumers to optimize their 
search for products, and by financial advisors in providing advice.  
The legal system will not be immune from this trend. We have 
suggested throughout this article that this technological revolution will 
dramatically alter the foundational structure of law as we know it. 
Predictive technology will generate greater ex ante information that 
can be used by lawmakers to write highly specific, complex laws. And 
individuals will receive notice of these complex laws in a simple form 
thanks to technological advances in communication. This will be the 
death of rules and standards and the rise of micro-directives.  
These developments will have profound implications for the role of 
judges, legislators, regulators, lawyers, and individuals in the legal 
system. But beyond that, we will have to change the way we think and 
talk about law. Take, for example, the classic debate between legal 
realists and legal formalists.190  Without ex post adjudication, this 
debate changes radically. As standards disappear and judges have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190  See generally Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REV. 119 1985); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010). 
On American legal realism, see Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis 
Patterson, ed. 2010); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222 (1931); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); WILFRED E. 
RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM 
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). On formalism, see generally, Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: 
On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 959 (1988). 
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progressively less influence, legislative intent will be entrenched and 
concretized in the catalog of micro-directives. 
Technological changes that vastly improve ex ante information will 
also breathe new life into old law-and-economics models that began 
with an assumption that lawmakers and citizens have full information. 
Friction in these models caused by imperfect and asymmetric 
information has provided a fertile source of material for critics, both 
inside and outside the field of law and economics. But these models 
will be given renewed importance. Similarly, the public choice 
literature will have an increased emphasis on how legislators choose 
objectives, rather than how they implement laws, while academic 
interest in subjects such as judicial behavior will dissipate. 
All of this is to say that legal institutions of all types will change 
radically. We are witnessing an information revolution. And, like other 
technological revolutions, it will precede a legal revolution. The 
industrial revolution, for example, saw human labor replaced by 
machine labor and the cost of transportation fell markedly with 
inventions such as the steam engine. It greatly reduced transaction 
costs and had widespread impact on all spheres of law including 
contract law,191 property law,192 employment law,193 criminal law,194 
and tort law.195  
The information revolution has already resulted in dramatic 
changes in the world of commerce. For example, companies such as 
YouTube, Uber, and Airbnb have disrupted and uprooted heavily 
regulated and stable industries. The coming technological revolution 
will lead to similar disruption of the legal services industry, but the 
effect on law will be much deeper and far wider. It will affect the very 
structure of legal commands and the way we, as a society, choose to 
govern the behavior of citizens.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See, e.g., P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, Ch. 1 (1974). 
192 For example, to see the feedback effect between intellectual property and the 
industrial revolution, see Joel Mokyr, Intellectual Property Rights, the Industrial 
Revolution, and the Beginnings of Modern Economic Growth, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 349 
(2009). 
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(1980). 
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